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DYNAMIC ENERGY FEDERALISM
HARI M. OSOFSKY & HANNAH J. WISEMAN

*

ABSTRACT
United States energy law and the scholarship analyzing it are
deeply fragmented. Each source of energy has a distinct legal regime,
and limited federal regulation in some areas has resulted in divergent state and local approaches to regulation. Much of the existing
energy law literature reflects these substantive and structural divisions, and focuses on particular aspects of the energy system and associated federalism disputes. However, in order to meet modern energy challenges—such as reducing risks from deepwater drilling and
hydraulic fracturing, maintaining the reliability of the electricity
grid in this period of rapid technological change, and producing
cleaner energy—we need a more dynamic, holistic understanding of
energy law. Examining the energy system as a whole reveals patterns
across substantive areas and allows these areas to learn from one
another.
Copyright © 2013 by Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman.
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This Article provides the first systematic account of energy federalism, proposing a novel model for understanding the energy system
and its federalism dynamics. It begins by describing the U.S. energy
system as comprised of interacting physical, market, and regulatory
dimensions. The Article next explains why this complex system requires a federalism model that moves beyond disputes over federal
versus state authority; it describes the many vertical interactions
(those across levels of government, from the local to the international) and horizontal interactions (those among actors within the same
level of government) within different types of energy regulation. The
Article then considers the governance challenges created by these interactions, with a focus on inadequate regulatory authority, simultaneous overlap and fragmentation of regulation and institutions,
and the difficulties of including key public and private stakeholders
while avoiding inappropriate regulatory capture, such as when powerful utilities or oil companies gain control of regulatory processes to
protect their private interests at the expense of the public. The Article
concludes by proposing dynamic federalism principles for designing
institutions that are responsive to these governance challenges
through (1) creating needed authority; (2) reducing fragmentation;
and (3) allowing for high levels of involvement from key public and
private stakeholders that accommodates meaningful input without
capture. It also introduces our next article, Hybrid Energy Governance, which applies these principles through detailed case studies to assess institutional innovation in areas critical to energy
transformation.
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INTRODUCTION
In the hot and humid summer of 2012, more than three million
residents in the District of Columbia and nearby states lost power, and
1
more than twenty people died. The effects spread nationwide as Net2
flix and Amazon servers in the D.C. area went down. For days, residents in the mid-Atlantic region suffered from continued high tem3
peratures and a lack of air conditioning. The immediate causes of
this massive disruption were trees falling on power lines during severe
4
storms. But the broader factors underlying this incident illuminate
the complexities of the U.S. energy system and the novel governance
challenges that it faces.
First, energy stands alone in its level of physical interconnectedness: Any one failure in the wires that transport electricity can cause
extensive rolling blackouts, as seen in Washington, D.C., New Jersey,
5
and Illinois in June 2012. Powerful storms like Hurricane Sandy,
which scientists project will become more common with climate

1. Washington’s Power Cuts: Taken By Trees, ECONOMIST, July 7, 2012, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/21558302.
2. Alon Harish, Rare “Derecho” Storm Ravaged Washington Area, ABC NEWS (July 2,
2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/derecho-storm-ravaged-washington-area/story?id=166
96593#.UBNhLfVRBM8.
3. Michael Schwirtz, Many Still Without Electricity in Mid-Atlantic States, N.Y. TIMES (July
1, 2012) http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/02/us/mid-atlantic-braces-for-more-stormsand-heat.html?_r=1&ref=washingtondc.
4. Id.
5. See Washington’s Power Cuts: Taken By Trees, supra note 1 (describing the geographic
breadth of the outage).
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change, cause larger disruptions and call for an updated, more flexi6
ble system of generating, transmitting, and distributing electricity.
Second, we increasingly rely on energy for our every task—largely
7
due to the computerization of our economy. Disruptions in the energy system can have widespread market impacts, as evidenced by that
summer’s brief but widespread outage of services used by millions of
8
people.
Finally, these physical and market forces interact with a multilevel regulatory system, requiring the coordination of actors across
city and state (and increasingly, international) lines and among various levels of government. Pepco, the utility that was largely blamed
for the power outage, for example, is a regional entity that serves
9
Maryland and D.C. customers. Its regulators include both the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation—a public-private federal
10
institution with regional components —and the state-level Maryland
Public Service Commission, which had earlier fined the utility for excessive outages due largely to poor communication with individual
11
utility consumers.

6. Operations

Update:

Hurricane

Sandy,

PJM,

http://www.pjm.com/~/media/

committees-groups/committees/oc/20121106/20121106-item-04-hurricane-sandy.ashx
(last visited Feb. 16, 2013) (assessing the impacts of the hurricane and reporting preliminary data, noting “140 transmission lines out of service,” 40 offline generators, and approximately 5 million customers without service during the peak of the problems, and observing that customer outages were “[h]igher than both the 6/29/2012 Derecho and
Hurricane Irene”); cf. Despite Customer Outages, Wholesale Electric Markets Operated During
Hurricane Sandy, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy
/detail.cfm?id=8750 (describing how a relatively flexible, regional governance entity called
the regional transmission organization, which has some of the needed characteristics of
coordination that we introduce in this Article, kept wholesale energy markets relatively
stable during the hurricane, although more than eight million customers lost power and
transmission lines and substations were damaged).
7. Michael Greenstone & Adam Looney, Paying Too Much for Energy? The True Costs of
our Energy Choices, 141 J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 10, 10 (2012).
8. See Harish, supra note 2 (describing the storm that knocked out an Amazon server).
9. About, PEPCO, http://www.pepco.com/welcome/ (last visited July 27, 2012).
10. About NERC: Company Overview, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.
com/page.php?cid=1|7 (last visited Nov. 20, 2012).
11. See Washington’s Power Cuts: Taken By Trees, supra note 1 (describing the fine). But
see Aaron C. Davis & Mary Pat Flaherty, Pepco Defends its Response to Derecho Storm, Saying it
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This example of power disruption in the mid-Atlantic states is not
unique. Weather extremes that affect the electricity grid have be12
come more common, and, throughout energy law, seemingly
straightforward and distinct problems involve complex interactions
among components of the physical electricity grid and its sources, the
markets that drive fuel extraction and the generation and movement
of electricity, and the relevant law and institutions at multiple levels of
13
These interactions create an important federalism
government.
challenge: How can energy regulation and its institutions create more
effective multi-level governance structures to meet our need for
cheap, clean, and reliable electricity as technology changes and as
customers demand more sustainable energy solutions?
Efforts in energy law scholarship and policy to address this question largely reflect the fragmented nature of the energy system; they
address different sources and institutions within the self-contained
categories that the energy law system has created for them. Numerous scholarly articles tackle particular issues, such as whether a federal
renewable energy standard should supplant existing state law regimes,
14
or how to overcome state law barriers to interstate transmission lines.
None of these analyses, however, creates a holistic model for conceptualizing energy federalism approaches across the full system. U.S.
energy policymakers similarly tend to suggest solutions that fail to address the full complexity of the system. Recent proposals from both
sides of the political aisle, and the resulting debates, generally have
addressed the appropriate roles of state and federal government on
particular energy issues without nuanced discussion of how the parts
15
fit together into an overall multi-level governance approach. These
“Mobilized Quickly,” WASH. POST (July 30, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
pepco-defends-its-response-to-derecho-storm-saying-it-mobilized-quickly/2012/07/30/
gJQAmxuVLX_story.html (explaining Pepco’s defense of its response time after the
derecho).
12. Matthew L. Wald & John Schwartz, Rise in Weather Extremes Threatens Infrastructure,
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2012, at A4.
13. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Institutions and Long Term Planning: Lessons from the California Electricity Crisis, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 95, 96–101 (2003) (describing the complexities of
California’s energy grid).
14. For examples of this narrowly focused scholarship, see infra notes 151–152.
15. See Jennifer A. Diouhy, Drilling Down: 5 Major Differences in Obama, Romney Energy
Plans, CHRON.COM (Aug. 23, 2012), http://blog.chron.com/txpotomac/2012/08/drillingdown-5-major-differences-in-obama-romney-energy-plans/ (comparing the two presidential
candidates’ energy plans prior to the 2012 election).
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silos, through which we address issues individually, limit our understanding of shared patterns and opportunities for synergistic learn16
ing. They also contribute to continued failures in efforts toward a
comprehensive, longer-term energy policy.
This Article will begin to provide a needed, more holistic approach by proposing a novel model for understanding the energy system, its federalism dynamics, and resulting governance challenges.
Through mapping interactions among different levels of government
(from local to international) and key entities at each level of government, this dynamic federalism model goes well beyond questions of
the appropriateness of federal versus state regulatory authority. It
categorizes these interactions both with respect to the common challenges that they create and the solutions needed to overcome them,
thus providing a better understanding of patterns and offering solutions grounded in nuanced federalism principles.
This model reveals patterns of inadequate regulatory authority;
simultaneous overlap and fragmentation; and entities in public regulatory roles enmeshed with, and at times partially made up of, the private actors that they ostensibly regulate across numerous types of energy law.
These patterns provide the basis for the Article’s
recommendations of principles for developing energy law institutions
that navigate federalism dynamics more effectively: (1) creation of
needed authority; (2) reduction of fragmentation; and (3) provision
of mechanisms for high levels of involvement from key public and
private stakeholders that allow for meaningful input without capture,
such as when powerful utilities or oil companies gain control of regulatory processes to protect their private interests at the expense of the
public. Our next article, Hybrid Energy Governance, will assess institutions that have begun to incorporate these strategies in multiple areas
17
of energy law critical to addressing modern energy challenges.
Through its ambitious, synthetic approach to energy law, this Article will make important theoretical and practical contributions.
Theoretically, it will argue against forcing energy law into existing,
constrained understandings of federalism and instead for creating a
more dynamic, nuanced model for federalism analysis. Our federalism model also infuses governance issues into federalism, showing
16. For an in-depth discussion of the current state of energy law federalism scholarship and the need for a dynamic model, see infra Part II.A.
17. Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, __ ILL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=214
7860.
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that questions about how different levels of government interact cannot be separated from the construction of institutions and their decision-making processes; these complex interactions create challenges
for such construction and opportunities for innovation. This model
therefore provides a new way of conceptualizing the field that is
grounded in the unique characteristics of the energy system.
Practically, this Article’s approach could help foster a needed rethinking of energy governance. It will demonstrate how common
characteristics of energy governance systems constrain effectiveness,
and it will model how to analyze these patterns, which allows for largely separate areas of energy law to learn from one another. It will then
propose principles for more effective institutional construction
grounded in the more dynamic understanding of federalism and governance that we have proposed. These principles are not simply theoretical ones. They provide the basis for our next article’s assessment
of regulatory innovation in the context of hybrid regional institu18
tions that have begun to make progress toward managing risky, un19
conventional fuel extraction technologies like hydraulic fracturing
and deepwater drilling appropriately; providing adequate pathways to
update our aging electrical grid and implement smart grid approaches; and allowing us to integrate cleaner sources onto it effectively.
Part I of this Article will map the interacting physical, market,
and regulatory dimensions of the energy system. Part II then will consider the federalism implications of this complex system; it will argue
for the need for a more holistic, dynamic approach to energy federalism and will map the simultaneous vertical (multi-level) and horizontal (same level) interactions taking place across energy law. Part III
will explore the contours of the specific governance problems that
these federalism interactions create, with a focus on the abovedescribed patterns. This Article will conclude by proposing principles
that could help address these governance problems and introducing
our application of these principles in a series of pieces analyzing energy federalism and governance.

18. For a definition of “hybrid regional governance,” see id. (manuscript at 6–9).
19. Hydraulic fracturing is also called “fracking,” “fracing,” or “hydrofracking.” Hydraulic Fracturing, ASS’N OF AM. STATE GEOLOGISTS [hereinafter Fracking Fact Sheet],
http://www.stategeologists.org/temp/AASG%20Hydraulic%20Fracturing%20statement.p
df (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). For further discussion of “fracking” terminology, see Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229, 233
n.22 (2010).
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I. THE TRIPARTITE STRUCTURE OF THE U.S. ENERGY SYSTEM
The production and movement of energy presents one of the
greatest governance challenges of our time. The physical processes
that underlie much of our modern energy system—including primary
energy extraction and transportation and the generation, transporta20
tion, and distribution of electricity (secondary energy) —are necessary to sustain human life as we know it and yet are unusually complex
and difficult to manage. Because energy is at the core of every human
necessity, from enabling the provision of food, shelter, and clothing
to driving economic growth and essential interpersonal communications, it is inextricably intertwined with fundamental societal values of
fairness, justice, economic opportunity, and environmental protection. As humans demand energy transformation in the form of
cleaner, more affordable, and more accessible energy, and as technology introduces new opportunities and challenges into an already
21
complex system, these developments run up against the boundaries
of traditional governance structures and create the need for rapid
regulatory innovation. This innovation, in turn, requires new theoretical approaches to governance, and particularly to federalism—the
guiding force behind decisions about interactions among governmental and nongovernmental actors across levels of government.
This Part delineates the complex grid of physical, market, and
regulatory interactions that form the current U.S. energy system and
drive its governance challenges. As illustrated in Figure 1, the energy
system in the United States is a tripartite structure comprised of physical infrastructure and sources, market forces, and regulations that
both shape and are shaped by these physical and market forces. This
system simultaneously drives and constrains regulatory innovation at
22
the domestic level, which in turn forces unique interactions among
regulatory peers as well as among different levels of government.
20. In addition to secondary energy (electricity), we rely—although decreasingly so—
on primary energy, which is fuel burned to directly power something or produce heat,
such as in a car or furnace.
21. For a full discussion of energy transitions, see Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 17.
22. Indeed, due to the interconnected nature of energy, it is increasingly difficult to
separate domestic from international regulation. The North American Electric Reliability
Corporation, for example, writes and implements standards intended to guarantee the
provision of a constant and adequate supply of electricity in the United States and several
Canadian provinces.

See Governance: Canada, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP.,

http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=1|8|293 (last visited July 10, 2012) (showing memo-
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the demand for these energy sources does not match their spatial distribution, the resources must be moved from their points of produc24
tion or generation to end users domestically and internationally.
25
Coal is easily stored and moved by rail or ship, while natural gas
26
often is pressurized or liquefied for efficient long-distance transport
27
and gas storage is available but more limited. Oil and natural gas
are often transported by pipeline, although depending on the form in
which the fuel is transported and the distance of transport, trucks,
28
ships, and rail are also used. Nuclear energy consumes comparative24. The longer the transmission distance, the more electricity is lost in the process.
Electricity losses are calculated based on total electricity generated multiplied by the “distance from the source to the load [electricity demand]” multiplied by a phase calculation
and all divided by the voltage (in kilovolts). Benjamin I. Phillips & Richard S. Middleton,
SimWIND: A Geospatial Infrastructure Model for Optimizing Wind Generation and Transmission,
43 ENERGY POL’Y 291, 296 (2012); see also id. (explaining that transmission line type and
length are critical factors in transmission loss and explaining that for a 750-kilovolt line
with an input of 4,352 megawatts, losses are 5.42% over 500 kilometers and 10.83% over
1,000 kilometers).
25. Transporters now primarily rely on rail, rather than barges, to transport coal within the United States. See Jeffrey K. Lazo & Katherine T. McClain, Community Perceptions,
Environmental Impacts, and Energy Policy: Rail Shipment of Coal, 24 ENERGY POL’Y 531, 532
(1996) (describing the transition from barges to rail transport); Coal Transportation Issues,
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (2007), http://205.254.135.7/oiaf/aeo/otheranalysis/cti.html
(“Most of the coal delivered to U.S. consumers is transported by railroads, which accounted for 64 percent of total domestic coal shipments in 2004.”); Today in Energy: Coal Stockpiles Above Five-Year Range in First Quarter of 2012, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 31, 2012),
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6490 (describing coal stockpiles at power plants).
26. See Natural Gas: About U.S. Natural Gas Pipelines, Transportation Process and Flow,
ENERGY

INFO.

ADMIN.,

http://205.254.135.7/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_

publications/ngpipeline/process.html (last visited July 10, 2012) (explaining that compressor stations “increase the pressure and rate of flow, and thus, maintain the movement
of natural gas along the pipeline”). Gas transported internationally is often liquefied.
27. See id. (describing “depleted reservoirs in oil and/or gas fields, aquifers, and salt
cavern formations” that store natural gas in the United States); MASS. INST. OF TECH., THE
FUTURE OF NATURAL GAS 3 (2011), available at http://web.mit.edu/mitei/research/
studies/documents/natural-gas-2011/NaturalGas_Report.pdf (noting that “because of its
gaseous form and low energy density, natural gas is uniquely disadvantaged in terms of
transmission and storage”).
28. See MASS. INST. OF TECH., supra note 27, at 3 (explaining that “[a]s a liquid, oil can
be readily transported over any distance by a variety of means” but that “the vast majority

2013]

DYNAMIC ENERGY FEDERALISM

783

ly little fuel and relies on existing highways for transport, but
29
transport of this fuel is a riskier process. Renewable energy generators, in contrast, must move to the fuel; they must locate a spot on the
globe with sunlight, wind, or other resources that are sufficiently
abundant to support economically feasible electricity production and
30
then transport their product through wires.
The uneven global and domestic distribution of the various fuels,
and particularly the increasing reliance upon secondary energy (electricity) within the United States, causes many of the complications in
the physical domestic energy picture. The United States has abun31
dant natural gas, coal, and renewable resources, and indeed more
of natural gas supplies are delivered to market by pipeline”); see also Wendy N. Duong,
Partnerships with Monarchs—Two Case Studies: Case Two Partnerships with Monarchs in the Development of Energy Resources: Dissecting an Independent Power Project and Re-Evaluating the Role
of Multilateral and Project Financing in the International Energy Sector, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON.
L. 69, 70–71 (2005) (“Crude oil can be shipped all over the world. On the other hand,
natural gas transportation by ship is only economically feasible if the natural gas is liquefied—the cooling and compression needed to ‘shrink’ the gas from its original volume.”
(citing A. Kaplan & Graham Marshall, World LNG Trade Responding to Increased Natural Gas
Demand, OIL & GAS J., Nov. 24, 2003, at 74)).
29. Cf. Lucas W. Davis, Prospects for Nuclear Power, 26 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 49, 58–59
(2012) (explaining that “fuel expenditures represent a relatively small proportion of the
total cost of nuclear power”); Marvin Baker Schaffer, Toward a Viable Nuclear Waste Disposal
Program, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 1382, 1387 (2011) (noting the risk of an “[a]ccident or terrorist
attack while transporting casks,” of nuclear waste in the nuclear waste disposal (not fuel)
context, but concluding that “no explosion would occur internal to the casks” and that
radioactive dispersal would be limited to “a few meters”).
30. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., TRANSMISSION PRICING ISSUES FOR ELECTRICITY
GENERATION FROM RENEWABLE RESOURCES 3 (1998) [hereinafter TRANSMISSION PRICING],
available at ftp://ftp.eia.doe.gov/features/transprc.pdf (noting that nonrenewable fuels
can be moved from the point of extraction to the power plant and that renewables lack
this advantage). For an analysis of the technical and policy issues of integrating renewables into grids globally, see Christof Timpe et al., Scoping Paper: Integration of Electricity from
Renewable Energy Sources into European Electricity Grids (ETC/ACC Technical Paper, 2010),
available

at

http://acm.eionet.europa.eu/reports/docs/ETCACC_TP_2010_18_REG_

Integration.pdf.
31. Energy In Brief: What Is the Role of Coal in the United States?, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://205.254.135.7/energy_in_brief/role_coal_us.cfm (updated July 18, 2012) (“The
United States is home to the largest estimated recoverable reserves of coal in the world. In
fact, we have enough coal to last more than 200 years, based on current production levels.”); Energy In Brief: What Is Shale Gas and Why Is It Important?, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
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32

oil than previously thought. But we still rely on fuel imports for
33
34
about a quarter of our energy mix, especially for transportation,
and the resources within our borders—fuels that we rely on for the
bulk of our energy—are concentrated within certain regions. The
35
Midwest has extensive wind resources and relatively few electricity
users, for example, thus requiring massive new investments in transmission if its energy resources are to be effectively harnessed, whereas
36
the Southeast has comparatively few renewable or fossil fuels.
http://205.254.135.7/energy_in_brief/about_shale_gas.cfm (updated July 9, 2012) (“The
availability of large quantities of shale gas should enable the United States to consume a
predominantly domestic supply of gas for many years and produce more natural gas than
it consumes.”); DEP’T OF ENERGY, 20% WIND BY 2030: INCREASING WIND ENERGY’S
CONTRIBUTION TO U.S. ELECTRICITY SUPPLY (2008) (explaining that we have the potential
to produce 20% of electricity from wind by 2030).
32. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 23, at 75 (projecting that the United States will
be “97% energy self sufficient in net terms” due to an “upward trend” in oil production,
declining oil imports, .and rising production of gas and renewables).
33. Net energy imports in 2007 accounted for 29% of all U.S. energy production and
consumption. This dropped to 22% in 2010 due to the recession, and the Energy Information Administration (“EIA”) predicts that it will drop further to 13% by 2035 due primarily to onshore “tight oil” production (the production of oil from shales and tight sands
using hydraulic fracturing and other technologies). ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., AEO 2012
EARLY RELEASE OVERVIEW 8 (2012), available at www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/0383er
(2012).pdf; see also Michael Cohen, A Renaissance in U.S. Production: Light Tight Oil, J. INT’L
ENERGY ADMIN., Autumn 2012, at 31 (defining “tight oil”).
34. See Dependence on Foreign Oil, supra note 32 (showing that net imports accounted for
45% of U.S. petroleum demand in 2011); ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW
2011, at Table 5.13a–d (2011), available at http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/
pdf/aer.pdf (showing that transportation accounted for more than 13 million barrels per
day of petroleum use in 2011 as compared to 357,000 barrels per day for the residential
sector, more than 4 million for the industrial sector, and 130,000 for the electricity sector).
35. Wind Powering America, Utility-Scale Land-Based 80-Meter Wind Maps, DEP’T OF
ENERGY, http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/wind_maps.asp (last updated Sept. 12,
2012) (showing the highest average onshore wind speed 80 meters above ground as occurring throughout the Midwest).
36. See Jim Rossi, The Shaky Political Economy Foundation of a National Renewable Electricity
Requirement, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 361, 367 (2011) (noting that “southeastern states have
strong potential for biomass development, but in comparison to most western states, they
have very limited opportunities for the development of wind, solar, and geothermal”); State
Energy Data System, 2011 Estimates, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/beta/state/
(last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
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The environmental and social impacts of global and domestic
fuels also differ substantially, which complicates decisions about
whether and where to build new infrastructure to transport fuels and
electricity. Wind farms disrupt habitat and the breeding routines of
endangered birds, kill bats, and have non-negligible visual and noise
37
impacts. Extraction of oil and natural gas, which increasingly re38
quires unconventional technologies, has polluted valuable natural
resources, and spills have had catastrophic social and economic ef39
fects. Coal extraction, of which sixty percent is now surface min40
ing, has similarly created short-term jobs but has destroyed some
41
communities and polluted surface waters. Further, all fossil fuels
37. See FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., LAND-BASED WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES 2012, at 1,
available at http://www.fws.gov/windenergy/docs/WEG_final.pdf (summarizing studies
that describe bird and bat fatalities caused by wind energy equipment); R.H. Bakker et al.,
Impact of Wind Turbine Sound on Annoyance, Self-Reported Sleep Disturbance and Psychological
Distress, 425 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 42, 46–48 (2012) (finding a significant positive correlation
between noise from wind turbines and psychological distress).
38. Jennifer L. Miskimins et al., The Technical Aspects of Hydraulic Fracturing, ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. FOUND., no. 5 (2011) (“Unconventional resources exist in petroleum accumulations that are pervasive throughout a large area and that are not significantly affected
by hydrodynamic influences,” and that have “low flow capabilities”); id. (explaining that
hydraulic fracturing is “[r]equired for unconventional reservoirs”); HALLIBURTON, U.S.
SHALE GAS: AN UNCONVENTIONAL RESOURCE, UNCONVENTIONAL CHALLENGES 3, available
at http://www.halliburton.com/public/solutions/contents/shale/related_docs/H063771.
pdf (describing horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing as “key enabling technologies”
in the Barnett Shale of Texas, a very productive source of U.S. gas).
39. See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING at 1 (2011), http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf (reporting that, in total, the BP oil well
incident in the Gulf of Mexico released more than 4 million barrels of oil).
40. Secure and Reliable Energy Supplies—Brief Overview of Coal Mining, NAT’L ENERGY
TECH. LAB., http://www.netl.doe.gov/KeyIssues/overviewofmining.html; see also ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., COAL PRODUCTION AND NUMBER OF MINES BY STATE AND MINE TYPE, 2010,
2009, available at http://205.254.135.7/coal/annual/pdf/table1.pdf (showing surface and
underground mining numbers by state); see also Western Surface Coal Mining, § 11.9.1,
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ttnchie1/ap42/ch11/final/c11s09.pdf (last
visited Jan. 7, 2013) (describing the western surface coal mining process, in which topsoil
is scraped away and “the earth that is between the topsoil and coal seam . . . is leveled,
drilled, and blasted”).
41. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Envtl. Protection Agency, Improving EPA Review
of Appalachian Surface Coal Mining Operations Under the Clean Water Act, National En-
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42

emit greenhouse gases when burned, causing an environmental crisis of global proportions. Expanding knowledge about the comparative carbon emissions of these fuels, and particularly the lower but still
43
substantial climate impact of natural gas, affects fuel choices and has
begun to significantly change electricity generation in the United
44
45
States. Most new power plants use natural gas rather than coal, for
vironmental Policy Act, and the Environmental Justice Executive Order, at 4 (July 21,
2011), available at http://appvoices.org/images/uploads/2012/08/Final_Appalachian_
Mining_Guidance_07211111.pdf (“The environmental legacy of [surface] mining operations . . . is far-reaching [and poses] new environmental and health challenges that were
largely unknown even ten years ago.”). Coal also provides important jobs for communities—often the only jobs currently available within these communities. This perpetuates
boom and bust cycles, however, which leave communities stranded when the resource is
no longer abundant. Dan Black et al., The Economic Impact of the Coal Boom and Bust, 115
ECON. J. 449, 463–68 (2005) (studying changes in employment and other economic effects
of boom and bust cycles caused by coal extraction).
42. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND
SINKS: 1990–2010, paper 430-R-12-001, at 2–5 to 2–7, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/
Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-Main-Text.pdf

[hereinafter

GHG

INVENTORY] (showing greenhouse gas emissions by gas and source).
43. Estimates of these emissions vary widely, but some scientists believe that “on a perjoule basis, burning methane, the primary constituent of natural gas, produces less carbon
dioxide than burning coal.” Richard Lovett, Natural Gas Greenhouse Emissions Study Draws
Fire, NATURE (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110415/full/news.2011
.242.html. Lifecycle emissions are of course higher due to methane leakage during the
drilling and fracturing process and from pipelines. See MARK FULTON, WORLDWATCH
INSTITUTE, COMPARING LIFE-CYCLE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM NATURAL GAS AND
COAL 2 (2011), available at http://www.worldwatch.org/system/files/pdf/Natural_Gas_
LCA_Update_082511.pdf (describing the author’s methodology to calculate greenhouse
gas emissions from natural gas, which incorporated methane emissions as a “byproduct of
petroleum production” and “the natural gas that passes through distribution pipelines”).
44. Today in Energy (2011), ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://205.254.135.7/todayinenergy
/detail.cfm?id=2070 (explaining that new natural gas-fired plants represented “81% of total generation capacity additions” from 2000–2010).
45. See U.S. Coal’s Share of Total Net Generation Continues to Decline, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(June 5, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6550 (noting declines in
the use of coal compared to other fuel types); Monthly Coal- and Natural Gas-Fired Generation
Equal for the First Time in April 2012, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 6, 2012),
http://205.254.135.7/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6990 (noting that although coal has
historically dominated U.S. electricity generation, “for the first time since EIA began collecting the data,” natural gas and coal contributed equally to power generation in April
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example, and some existing plants are switching to natural gas.
Plummeting natural gas prices and an abundant supply also have dis47
couraged renewable generation despite its positive climate impacts.
This Article focuses primarily on secondary energy (electricity)
and the many complex fuel and transportation choices underlying
electricity production, although it also considers the parallel risks and
inequities of unconventional fuel development that cross-cut the primary and secondary energy systems. It chooses this focus because
48
electricity occupies a large share of U.S. energy consumption and
contributes to a similarly large proportion of energy impacts: Electricity generation produced approximately one third of U.S. greenhouse
49
gas emissions in 2010. Indeed, our trajectory seems to be moving
even more rapidly toward secondary sources of energy as we begin to
50
plug in cars and continue to computerize a variety of systems.
Traditionally, electricity is generated at large power plants and
51
then moved to utilities and ultimately to customers, and this same
pattern can occur at much smaller scales through distributed generation and microgrids. Production and distribution still generally take
place in a more confined physical area than generation and transmis2012, each contributing “32% of total generation”); Clifford Krauss, Breaking Away from
Coal, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/business/energyenvironment/30utilities.html?pagewanted=all (“Over the last year and a half, at least 10
power companies have announced plans to close more than three dozen of their oldest,
least efficient coal-burning generators by 2019. A few are being replaced by new, more
efficient coal plants, but many more are being replaced by gas-fired plants.”).
46. See supra notes 44–45.
47. See infra note 93.
48. Of the sectors that consume primary energy, such as the industrial, transportation,
and electric power sectors, the highest percentage (40% of primary energy consumption)
is the electric power sector. Annual Energy Review, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 2012),
http://205.254.135.7/totalenergy/data/annual/pecss_diagram.cfm.
49. GHG INVENTORY, supra note 42.
50. See Availability of Hybrid and Plug-In Electric Vehicles, ALTERNATIVE FUELS DATA
CENTER, DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.afdc.energy.gov/vehicles/electric_availability.html
(last visited July 31, 2012) (“A number of light-, medium-, and heavy-duty hybrid electric
vehicles (HEVs), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), and all-electric vehicles (EVs)
are available from a variety of automakers or are in development.”).
51. See REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRIC REGULATION IN THE U.S.: A GUIDE
9–11 & Fig. 4.1 (2011) [hereinafter RAP GUIDE], www.raponline.org/document/
download/id/645 (providing an overview of the organization of the U.S. electric industry
and illustrating the elements of the grid).
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52

sion. Within the most common domestic secondary energy system, a
typical generator of electricity pipes in fuel or receives it by rail, burns
it to produce electricity, and then sells its product wholesale to utili53
ties or directly to industry users. In order to transport electricity to
the relevant markets, generators connect to a large network of trans54
mission lines, which are typically built and owned by utilities. Historically, utilities that owned and controlled transmission lines also
owned generation facilities and distribution lines and were thus “ver55
56
tically-integrated”; in many states, this system has not changed.
The utility or regional organization that controls the transmission lines bargains with generators regarding the terms of connection
and use of the line and ultimately enters into an interconnection
57
agreement with them. This agreement emerges only after the entity
52. See Sara C. Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl With Microgrids, 43 CONN. L. REV. 547, 551
(2010) (explaining that energy microgrids are an attractive policy choice because “[t]hey
decentralize energy production, reducing the need for nationwide transmission lines and
large-scale centralized plants”).
53. W.M. WARWICK, DEP’T OF ENERGY, A PRIMER ON ELECTRIC UTILITIES,
DEREGULATION, AND RESTRUCTURING OF U.S. ELECTRICITY MARKETS 2.2 (2002).
54. Traditionally, vertically integrated utilities owned and operated transmission and
distribution lines as well as generation. Increasingly, however, independent, transmissiononly utilities own and operate lines.

See, e.g., About Electric Transmission Texas, ELEC.

TRANSMISSION TEX., http://www.ettexas.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2012) (describing a joint venture between American Electric Power, which “owns the nation’s largest
electricity transmission system, a nearly 39,000-mile network that includes more than 765
kilovolt extra-high voltage transmission lines than all other United States transmission systems combined” and MidAmerican to form an independent transmission-only utility).
55. RAP GUIDE, supra note 51, at 10.
56. In 2010, electric utilities owned approximately sixty-two percent of “nameplate”
generating capacity (the technical potential output of generation capacity). Electric Power
Annual 2010, Existing Capacity by Producer Type, 2010, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 2010),
http://205.254.135.7/electricity/annual/pdf/table1.3.pdf (comparing the capacity of
“electric utilities” and “independent power producers”). The EIA definition of electric
utilities appears to generally align with vertically integrated utilities, as it defines the utility
as “[a] corporation, person, agency, authority, or other legal entity or instrumentality
aligned with distribution facilities for delivery of electric energy for use primarily by the
public.” Glossary, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=
E#el_utility. Those utilities that both distribute and generate electricity, as described in
the EIA capacity report, are at least partially vertically integrated.
57. Stephen M. Fisher, Note, Reforming Interconnection Queue Management Under FERC
Order No. 2003, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 117, 129 (2009) (explaining that after conducting inter-
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that controls the lines ensures that there is room in the lines for additional electricity and that the new generating source will not interfere
58
with smooth grid operations. In addition to accommodating individual interconnections, the transmission utility or a regional institu59
tion manages the flow of electricity through the wires. After identifying the “load” (electricity demanded by load serving entities—those
that provide electricity to consumers) and the amount of electricity
available from generators, the line operator balances these two factors
and sets the quantity of electricity that flows through transmission
60
lines. The operator must maintain a relatively constant voltage in
61
the lines, and thus carefully regulate flow, to avoid major outages,
which often spread instantaneously through an interconnected
62
transmission system. It also must provide electricity at the moment

connection studies to determine whether the transmission line can accommodate generation, “the transmission provider and interconnection customer then negotiate any remaining transaction-specific provisions” and enter into an interconnection agreement).
58. See id. (describing interconnection studies, including feasibility studies, as a means
“to ensure the proposed interconnection is reasonable from engineering and economic
perspectives”).
59. See Mason Willrich, Electricity Transmission Policy for America: Enabling a Smart Grid,
End-to-End 18–19 (Mass. Inst. of Tech., MIT-IPC-Energy Innovation Working Paper 09-003,
2009), available at http://web.mit.edu/ipc/research/energy/pdf/EIP_09-003.pdf (describing RTOs—grid operators— and their markets).
60. See id. at 19.

The electricity market varies by regional transmission organiza-

tion/grid operator and is far more complex than the brief description provided here.
Some have capacity markets, for example, where generators bid in actual capacities to provide power in the future, while others do not. Id.
61. K. Ramar & M.S. Raviprakasha, Design of Compensation Schemes for Long AC Transmission Lines for Maximum Power Transfer Limited by Voltage Stability, 17 ELECTRICAL POWER &
ENERGY SYS. 83, 83 (1995) (explaining that instability in the transmission system “may be
caused primarily by the loss of synchronism of one or more generating units . . . or by the
uncontrollable decay of system voltage over a significant portion of the network (voltage
instability)” and that voltage stability is the ability to “maintain stable load voltage magnitudes”).
62. SPENCER ABRAHAM, SEC. OF ENERGY, DEP’T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL TRANSMISSION
GRID STUDY 2 (2002), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/
TransmissionGrid.pdf (“Within each system, disturbances or reliability events are felt nearly instantaneously throughout the system.”).
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that it is demanded because large-scale electricity storage is not yet
63
available.
This dual mandate—accommodating fluctuating generation and
demand while maintaining a relatively constant voltage in the lines
and ensuring instantaneous availability of the product to be con64
sumed—is a core challenge of grid management. Transmission line
owners are wary of intermittent generation sources, such as solar and
wind, which send unpredictable amounts of electricity through the
65
wires. The smart grid, including improved technological ability to
predict availability of renewable resources, has begun to alleviate this
hurdle; computers incorporated within the grid can instantaneously
draw in new generation sources when needed and better predict and
66
balance supply and demand. Much progress remains to be made,
however, and computerization of the grid as part of a nationwide
67
In
smart grid initiative has expanded some reliability concerns.

63. But see Marc Beaudin et al., Energy Storage for Mitigating the Variability of Renewable
Electricity Source: An Updated Review, 14 ENERGY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 302, 311–12 (2010)
(describing research efforts in energy storage).
64. See David K. Detton, Contracting to Sell or Buy Electricity § 5, in THE ELECTRIC
INDUSTRY: OPPORTUNITIES AND IMPACTS FOR RESOURCE PRODUCERS, POWER GENERATORS,
MARKETERS, AND CONSUMERS (1996) (“Unlike natural gas, . . . the physical characteristics
of electricity not only make storage impractical, but impose unique ‘real time’ supply, delivery, and damage mitigation requirements.”).
65. See, e.g., Pedro J. Pizarro, Executive Vice President of Power Operations for Southern Cal. Edison Co., Remarks at the FERC Technical Conference: Integrating Renewable
Resources into the Wholesale Electric Grid (AD09-4), at 4 (Mar. 2, 2009), available at
http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20090302090557-Pizarro,%20SoCal%20
Edison-EEI.pdf (noting that higher levels of renewable generation “can result in significant amounts of surplus energy that cannot be used on the grid or sold to others,” in
which case power must be offloaded, and that the grid requires “higher Planning Reserve
Margins to back up the system when these intermittent resources are incapable of producing sufficient energy”).
66. See, e.g., ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC CORPORATION, USING SMART GRIDS TO ENHANCE
USE OF ENERGY-EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE-ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES 3.4 (2011), available at
http://www.pnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-20389.pdf
(“Smart grid technologies, such as transmission and distribution automation and active
distributed energy resources, allow a diverse and changing mix of renewable-energy resources to be accommodated on the grid.”).
67. See N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., RELIABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FROM THE
INTEGRATION OF SMART GRID 70 (2010), http://www.nerc.com/files/SGTF_Report_Final_
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many cases, renewable generators also lack access to transmission
even when interconnection is theoretically possible, as abundant renewable resources tend to be located in rural areas far from existing
68
transmission lines.
A utility that receives electricity from a transmission line ultimately distributes this electricity to retail customers through smaller, lower69
The combination of large transmission lines and
voltage lines.
smaller distribution lines for electricity forms a massive physical sys70
tem called the transmission grid. Together, the physical movement
of fuel to generators and of electricity to utilities and consumers
frame the markets that are the subject of the following Section.
B. Market
The demand for energy resources paired with their uneven distribution and resulting transportation challenges creates a market for
energy that interacts with each stage of the energy provision process.
This Section traces the ways in which the energy market, in its interaction with the underlying physical resources introduced above, forms a
complex, difficult-to-regulate structure. It first describes the evolving
economic structure of the market and then considers the market
forces at the primary stages of the energy provision process: generation and its accompanying fuels, transmission, and distribution.
United States energy markets must navigate both the increasing
transnational interconnections within historically regional and national markets and the partial evolution away from treating our domestic energy markets as natural monopolies (markets in which it
would be economically inefficient to have more than one provider,
often because of large infrastructure investments). Oil is the most international of the fuel markets in terms of its global price and its
transnational network of pipelines, while natural gas and electricity
posted.pdf (noting the vulnerability of a complex and interconnected smart grid to cyberattacks).
68. See TRANSMISSION PRICING, supra note 30, at 3 (describing the remote location of
certain renewable resources and noting, for example, that viable solar thermal generation
is limited to the southwestern United States).
69. ABRAHAM, supra note 62, at 90.
70. Id. at 2. Not all wires are connected, though; the United States has three major
grids—the Eastern, Western, and Texas Interconnections—which are physically separated.
Id. If one distribution or transmission line within any one of these grids fails, the effects
can spiral through large portions of each interconnection, as shown by historical blackouts
and rolling brownouts. Id. at 2, 20.
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71

have traditionally been regional in nature. This difference is largely
due to particular physical limitations of each type of energy in our
tripartite structure, as noted above. For example, natural gas typically
must be liquefied before being shipped long distances, which requires
expensive facilities; these facilities are not yet common but likely will
72
expand as natural gas supplies worldwide increase. Indeed, several
applications for liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) export terminals are
currently pending before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
73
(“FERC”). Electricity, too, has remained largely regional because of
the expense of constructing transmission lines across oceans and oth74
er natural and artificial barriers that divide countries. Governance
of energy is slowly becoming formally international, however, as more
electricity flows within transnational regions and neighboring countries begin to enlist common governing entities, such as the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”), with jurisdiction
75
both within the United States and parts of Canada. The influence of
international factors on U.S. energy markets, governance, and even its
physical infrastructure will likely continue to expand along with this
slow transition; indeed, a desire to avoid importing oil from countries
viewed as enemies has driven and will continue to drive much of our
76
fuel extraction policy.

71. See An Unconventional Bonanza, ECONOMIST, July 14, 2012, at 1 (“Only one-third of
all gas is traded across borders, compared with two-thirds of oil. Other commodities fetch
roughly the same price the world over, but gas has no global price.”).
72. See id. at 11–13 (discussing the barriers to liquefied natural gas but predicting a
gradual internationalization of the natural gas market).
73. See OFFICE OF ENERGY PROJECTS, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, NORTH
AMERICAN LNG IMPORT/EXPORT TERMINALS, PROPOSED/POTENTIAL (2012), available at
http://ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/lng/LNG-proposed-potential.pdf.
74. The transmission grid in the United States, for example, is highly interconnected
with Canada, but the lines are artificially separated at the border by a transformer, and
Canada maintains jurisdiction over its lines. ABRAHAM, supra note 62, at 20.
75. See, e.g., About NERC, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.com/page.
php?cid=1 (last visited Jan. 11, 2013) (“NERC is a self-regulatory organization, subject to
oversight by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and governmental authorities in Canada.”).
76. See, e.g., Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121
Stat. 1492 (2007) (aiming to “move the United States toward greater energy independence
and security” by increasing alternative fuel use and implementing energy reduction goals
in federal buildings, among other measures).

2013]

DYNAMIC ENERGY FEDERALISM

793

Just as international forces increasingly affect U.S. energy markets (and vice versa), our internal economic treatment of energy systems also has changed substantially in the past two decades. Traditionally, in the United States, almost all pieces of the physical energy
77
system were regarded as natural monopolies, with significant consequences for the regulatory system discussed in Part II.C. Over time,
this view has evolved. Restructuring of electricity regulation and other energy markets to allow for more competition, also known as deregulation, was popular in the 1990s but has slowed somewhat since
78
the Enron crisis. Even prior to the heavy restructuring trend in the
1990s, the federal government recognized that fuel extraction is a
classically competitive enterprise and thus deregulated prices of natural gas at the wellhead—meaning the price of natural gas sold from a
79
producer (the entity that extracts the gas) to a buyer. The federal
government and some states also began to view components of the
electricity system—particularly generation—as competitive and start-

77. Robert L. Bradley, Jr., The Origins and Development of Electric Power Regulation, in THE
END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC
POWER INDUSTRY 43, 46–57 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003) (describing
Samuel Insull’s successful campaign for state electricity regulation of utilities as natural
monopolies and how most states had established public utility commissions and natural
monopoly treatment by the 1930s and 40s).
78. See WILLIAM W. HOGAN, CTR. FOR RESEARCH IN REGULATED INDUS., ELECTRICITY
MARKET RESTRUCTURING: REFORMS OF REFORMS, 20TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 3–9 (2001),
available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/rut052501.pdf (describing U.S. restructuring and its motivations); Richard D. Cudahy, Whither Deregulation: A Look at the Portents, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 155, 172–75, 186 (2001) (describing the rise of deregulation, including in California, and concluding that “the California experience may
significantly slow the onward march of electricity deregulation in other parts of the country”); Alexia Brunet & Meredith Shafe, Beyond Enron: Regulation in Energy Derivatives Trading, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 665, 682–93 (2007) (describing post-Enron changes in energy markets and regulation); Electricity Restructuring by States, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., (2010),
http://205.254.135.7/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/restructure_elect.html (showing several states, in yellow, that have suspended restructuring).
79. See Suedeen G. Kelly, Natural Gas, in ENERGY LAW AND POLICY FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 8–23 (Energy Law Group eds., 2000) (discussing the passage of the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978, which provided for the phasing out of the regulation of natural gas
sales from producers to pipelines and other entities, and the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1986, which eventually removed all price controls on production).
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ed separating generation from transmission and distribution. Following this separation, small, independent entities began to compete
81
to generate electricity. Some components of the system that involve
major infrastructure investment, like transmission lines or pipelines,
remain as classic natural monopolies, however; it is not generally profitable for more than one company to make that investment in a par82
ticular area, and the infrastructure could become a problematic bot83
tleneck if not regulated.
These overall dynamics play out in varying ways at each stage of
the energy production process. Although historical and current energy subsidies and regulatory intervention make separating market
84
forces from governance difficult, the core economic drivers in elec85
tricity include the type of fuel used by generators, the quantity and

80. See Sandeep Vaheesan, Preempting Parochialism and Protectionism in Power, 49 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 87, 94 (2012) (explaining that “in a significant fraction of states, only transmission and distribution are treated as natural monopolies; generation and retailing are
open to competition” (footnote omitted)).
81. See Joseph T. Kelliher & Maria Farinella, The Changing Landscape of Federal Energy
Law, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 611, 642–43 (2009) (noting nonutility companies entering the
power generation market).
82. See David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 765, 772 (2008) (“Delivery—transmission and distribution service—is a natural monopoly because the construction of duplicate delivery networks between two points is often
inefficient.”).
83. See Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can Energy Markets Be Trusted?: The Effect of the Rise and
Fall of Enron on Energy Markets, 4 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 13 (2004) (explaining that
transmission “wires are the equivalent of a gas pipeline—an essential network industry that
is often a natural monopoly. Unless rate-regulated, a bottleneck industry can extract monopoly rents from generators and end users who must use the transmission service to move
electricity to market.”).
84. See, e.g., CONG. QUARTERLY INC., ENERGY POLICY 66–67 (2d ed. 1981) (discussing
congressional requirements in the 1970s and early 80s that power plants use coal instead
of natural gas).
85. STAN

KAPLAN,

CONG.

RESEARCH

SERV.,

RL

34746,

POWER

PLANTS:

CHARACTERISTICS AND COSTS 1 (2008) (identifying “construction costs, fuel expense, environmental regulations, and financing costs” as the “factors that determine the cost of electricity from new power plants”); cf., Davis, supra note 29, at 58–59 (explaining that unlike
in fossil fuel-generated power plants, the price of fuel does not drive the cost of nuclear
power significantly but that the price of fossil fuels, which still are required for a nuclear
plant, affects cost).
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86

timing of electricity production, and the ultimate destination of
generated electricity. These forces, which have recently been shaped
87
88
by demands for an updated grid, cleaner fuels, and consumer con89
trol of electricity consumption and price, strongly influence the pace
of energy transformation.
86. See, e.g., Felix Mormann, Requirements for a Renewables Revolution, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q.
903, 958 (2011) (describing “peaker” power plants, which are “older plants that can be
dispatched at relatively short notice but have such high operational costs that they are not
profitable other than at peak demand, when wholesale prices are highest”).
87. See, e.g., DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMM., THE CASE FOR A 21ST CENTURY ELECTRICITY
TRANSMISSION SYSTEM (2009), available at http://dpc.senate.gov/dpcdoc.cfm?doc_name=
fs-111-1-34 (arguing that “[t]he electricity transmission grid in the United States is regionally fragmented, inadequate, and does not offer the state-of-the-art transmission system
that is needed to access the country’s best renewable energy resources”); Charles Cate,
Southwest Power Pool, Integrated Transmission Planning Process, FERC Technical Conference (March 19–21, 2012,), http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/201204101125
57-spp.pdf (explaining that more transmission is needed to improve grid reliability, add
renewables to the grid, allow for diverse fuel usage for reliability, create more efficient
electricity delivery, and reduce the need for new generation, among other factors).
88. See, e.g., Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR
RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY (Oct. 2012) [hereinafter RPS Policies], http://dsireusa.org/
documents/summarymaps/RPS_map.pdf (showing 29 states, the District of Columbia, and
two territories as having renewable portfolio standards, which require a certain portion of
electricity to come from renewable sources).
89. See,

e.g., An

Introduction

to ELCON, ELEC. CONSUMERS RES. COUNCIL,

http://www.elcon.org/ (last visited July 11, 2012) (explaining that the council represents
the views of industrial electricity consumers before FERC and within NERC); Charles H.
Koch, Jr., Collaborative Governance in the Restructured Electricity Industry, 40 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 589, 602 (2005) (observing that “[l]arge consumers have enough economic power to
create alternatives, even when their local utility has some degree of market power,” and
that they often align with utilities to influence political decisions, but arguing that small
industrial and residential consumers have lost political power with electricity restructuring). In the many states that remain regulated, however, the mandate that public service
and public utility commission only approve “reasonable” rates can give consumers a powerful voice in major decisions about power plant construction, fuel choice, and other electricity-based issues. Megan J. Hertzler & Mara N. Koeller, Who Pays for Carbon Costs? Uncertainty and Risk in Response to the Current Patchwork of Carbon Regulation for Public Utilities, 36
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 904, 931 (2010) (explaining that “rates for service are set through a
quasi-legislative process involving review by state regulatory commissions acting under
broad powers conferred by the state legislature to determine just and reasonable rates
through an examination of the public utility’s costs”).
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At the electricity generation stage, the fuel chosen by generators
90
is a choice with powerful environmental and social effects that drives
decisions about the location and capacity of transmission or fuel
transportation infrastructure, and it is largely a function of available
extraction technologies. A booming natural gas supply enabled by
recently expanded horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing tech91
nologies, for example, has caused gas prices to drop and has led
many existing power generators to switch to gas. Indeed, most new
92
generating capacity built in the United States is natural gas-fired.
This trend, in turn, creates incentives against constructing more expensive renewable generating capacity—thus partially slowing what
appeared to be a rapid yet small energy transition toward renewa93
bles.

90. See, e.g., Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, the Clean Air Act, and Industrial Pollution, 30
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 51, 63–64, 75–76 (2012) (describing acid rain caused by coalfired power plants and the contribution of these same plants to greenhouse gas emissions
and co-pollutants, explaining that power plants “emit half of the nation’s mercury emissions,” noting the health and economic impacts of pollution, with respect to co-pollutants
from coal, noting that the level of emissions depends in part on the type of coal burned,
and observing that “choices among renewable energy technologies will impact net copollutant levels”).
91. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., AVERAGE PRICE OF NATURAL GAS SOLD TO ELECTRIC POWER
CONSUMERS, BY STATE, 2010–2012 (Oct. 2012), available at http://205.254.135.7/natural
gas/monthly/pdf/table_23.pdf. In January 2010, the average price of natural gas sold to
power plants was $6.98 per thousand cubic feet of gas. Id. By January 2011, this had
dropped to $5.66 and to $3.81 by January 2012. Id.
92. See supra note 45.
93. So far, evidence of gas outcompeting potential renewable projects has been anecdotal, but an MIT source predicts massive displacement of new renewables by gas plants.
SERGEY PALTSEV ET AL., MASS. INST. OF TECH. PROGRAM ON THE SCIENCE AND POLICY OF
GLOBAL CHANGE, REPORT NO. 186, THE FUTURE OF U.S. NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION, USE,
AND

TRADE 13–15 (2010), available at http://globalchange.mit.edu/files/document/MIT

JPSPGC_Rpt186.pdf. Several concerns also have prevented a broader transition from coal
to gas in the electricity world. Power plants have historically experienced broad price volatility in natural gas and are worried about continued price fluctuations. Id. at 30–31.
Cheap, abundant coal, in contrast, has offered a more steady and predictable fuel option.
Id. at 20–21. Even if natural gas prices remained consistently low and encouraged generators to switch to gas, this trend could disincentivize expanded gas extraction; hydraulic
fracturing is an expensive extraction technology, and energy companies might avoid drilling and fracturing new wells if they believe that the break-even price is elusive. Id. at 6–10.
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Several forces impede any type of generator commitment to a
new fuel, whether natural gas, renewables, or other sources. In the
case of natural gas, for example, generators sometimes enter into
long-term contracts for fuel supply with an energy marketer, largely
94
for price-hedging purposes. The energy marketer, in turn, works
with individual gas producers and contracts with pipelines to
95
transport the gas to utility clients. Long-term contracts can disincentivize switches to new fuels or generating plants, particularly more expensive ones. Similar entrenchment within the energy system extends
beyond fuel supply to the utility that buys wholesale power and sells
this power retail to customers. Utilities sometimes sign power purchase agreements with generators, ensuring that generators have a reliable outlet for their product and that utilities have a steady supply of
96
electricity at a predictable price. If utility customers demand new
generators with access to more alternative fuel sources, long-term

94. Judith M. Matlock, Impact of Restructuring of the Electric Power Industry on Oil, Gas,
Coal, and Other Mineral Producers, ROCKY MTN. MINERAL L. INST. § 1.16[2] (43rd ed. 1997)
(describing the stranded costs that can result from long-term fuel contracts). But see id.
§ 1.16[1] (noting that “[a]s utilities face competition in the generation segment of their
business, this is expected to reduce the demand for long-term fuel contracts”).
95. See, e.g., SOUTHWEST ENERGY, http://www.southwest-energy.com (last visited Nov.
4, 2012) (explaining that Southwest Energy, a midstream marketer, specializes in “supply
aggregation, sales, and logistical delivery”); see also JAMES HICKEY, JR. ET AL., ENERGY LAW
AND POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2000)

(describing gas marketing).

96. Detton, supra note 64, at 5-5 (explaining that “some physical contracts charge a
price for the seller’s commitment to reserve capacity, regardless of whether the buyer actually takes the electricity, as well as a separate price for the electricity actually received,”
that some are “firm, meaning that only certain forces outside a party’s control may justify
interruption of receipt or delivery,” and that “[t]he price may be fixed to lock in current
market prices to reduce price risk in the future,” although “[t]ransaction agreements for
longer terms . . . may use a wider variety of pricing terms”). Long-term contracts in some
cases may benefit renewable producers in the future, as renewable generators typically
“lock in” deals through these contracts. David A. Domansky, The Indefatigable Power of
Wind: A Practical Treatment of Development of Wind Projects, 55 ROCKY MTN. MINERAL L. FDN.
INST. § 5-1 (2009) (noting that “in a typical wind project . . . the power purchaser . . . purchases the [p]roject’s output pursuant to a long-term Power Purchase Agreement”); see
also Marc B. Mihaly, Recovery of a Lost Decade (Or Is It Three?): Developing the Capacity in Government Necessary to Reduce Carbon Emissions and Administer Energy Markets, 88 OR. L. REV.
405, 476–77 (2009) (noting that large industrial consumers sometimes bypass utilities and
directly enter into power purchase agreements with generators).
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agreements may constrain the utility’s ability to switch. Also, statebased ratemaking regimes for retail electricity constrain this ability
98
because reasonable rate standards are required, thus limiting utilities’ use of relatively more expensive alternative fuels.
Market forces in the transmission sector have similarly powerful
effects within the energy system as a whole. As noted above, transmission lines are a classic natural monopoly, and many utilities that own
99
transmission lines also own generation capacity. Rather than raising
prices, they could simply block all other generators from using the
lines or charge exorbitant fees. While a number of regulations have
emerged to temper these effects, the entrenched transmission regime
remains a powerful bottleneck and a potential blockade to desired
100
changes in the energy system. Utilities can still deny generators access to the grid if generation will be too intermittent and will interfere
101
with effective grid operation. Line connections also can be delayed
102
by the long queue of generators awaiting interconnection.
97. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Lesser, The Used and Useful Test: Implications for a Restructured
Electric Industry, 23 ENERGY L.J. 349, 349 (2002) (describing how “[i]n 1987, a group of
nine Vermont utilities . . . entered into a thirty-year contract, from 1990 to 2020, for power” from a hydroelectric generator).
98. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 56–235.2 (2012) (explaining the “just and reasonable”
rate requirement for public utilities in Virginia).
99. See Vaheesan, supra note 80, at 94 (noting that “[i]n much of the West and Southeast, most utilities remain vertically integrated and regulated as natural monopolies,” although recognizing that new generating firms can enter the market and sell to these utilities).
100. Cf. id. at 115 (noting that “incumbent utilities with significant political clout in
state government can use siting processes to block new transmission lines as a means to
protect their existing market power”).
101. See, e.g., R. BRENT ALDERFER ET AL., MAKING CONNECTIONS: CASE STUDIES OF
INTERCONNECTION BARRIERS AND THEIR IMPACT ON DISTRIBUTED POWER PROJECTS 37
(Natl. Renewable

Energy

Lab., Paper NREL/SR-200-28053, 2000), available at

http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy00osti/28053.pdf (“There were several case-study examples
of distributed power proponents being denied interconnection and parallel operation by
either investor owned or publicly owned utilities.”). But see infra text accompanying note
136 (describing uniform interconnection standards).
102. See Stephen M. Fisher, Note, Reforming Interconnection Queue Management Under
FERC Order No. 2003, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 117, 119 (2009) (observing that many regional
interconnection queues “are backlogged with hundreds of power projects, representing
tens of thousands of megawatts of generating capacity” and that projects are sometimes
backlogged “several months” due to the wait).
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New generators—particularly renewable installations located far
from load centers—also need new lines, and they often rely on utilities to build them. However, beyond controlling access to existing
103
Although
lines, utilities can also refuse to construct new ones.
“merchant” transmission lines constructed by non-vertically integrated
utilities are slowly emerging, the large utilities still hold the bulk of
104
the capital and expertise necessary to construct new transmission.
105
Existing regulations, too, favor construction by existing utilities. Yet
vertically integrated utilities with their own generation capacity have
few incentives to build new transmission that will accommodate new,
106
competitive generation.
Finally, even utilities willing to build new lines face a dilemma:
They want up-front assurances that generators will in fact construct
new capacity and connect it to the line, yet generators are unwilling to
build until they have a reasonable guarantee of grid access. Texas has
solved this problem by designating “competitive renewable energy
zones” where construction of new wind generation is anticipated and
107
by requiring rapid construction of transmission to these zones. Cal108
The western states,
ifornia has also implemented a similar system.
in turn, have joined in an attempt to designate regional renewable
109
zones and encourage construction of transmission to them, but the
103. See Steven J. Eagle, Securing a Reliable Electricity Grid: A New Era in Transmission Siting
Regulation?, 73 TENN. L. REV. 1, 6 (2005) (“After the FERC issued Order 888, which mandated open access to transmission lines, investment in new bulk transmission facilities
dropped by nearly 50%.” (footnote omitted)).
104. See id. (noting “entry-deterring practices” by utilities against merchant transmission).
105. See, e.g., Ashley Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu, 81
U. COLO. L. REV. 705, 720 (2010) (explaining that “in Colorado, it is not clear that anyone
other than a public utility may apply to site a transmission line, although a public utility is
defined broadly so that any party operating transmission lines may be a public utility”); see
also Alexandra Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1079 (2013) (describing varied policies regarding eminent domain authority for transmission lines).
106. See supra text accompanying note 100.
107. Tex. Pub. Utility Comm’n Order 33672 (2008); PUCT—CREZ Home Page, PUB.
UTIL. COMM’N OF TEX., http://www.texascrezprojects.com/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
108. Renewable Energy Transmission Initiative, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, http://www.energy.
ca.gov/reti/index.html.
109. See W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N & DEP’T OF ENERGY, WESTERN RENEWABLE ENERGY
ZONES—PHASE 1 REPORT 3–4 (2009), available at http://www.westgov.org/wga/publicat/
WREZ09.pdf (describing Western Renewable Energy Zones).
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Western Governors’ Association’s lack of regional authority over
transmission siting may stifle serious investment in generation or
110
transmission.
Finally, at the distribution level, where a utility provides electricity to individual consumers or a marketer connects consumers directly
to generators, a number of market forces affect the types of energy
generated and consumer access to it. Historically, vertically integrat111
ed utilities charged customers fixed, regulated rates for electricity.
In exchange for offering rates controlled by the state’s public utility
or public service commission, utilities enjoyed a natural monopoly in
112
a given service area. Consumers had no choice but to buy electricity
113
Consumers also had few means of reducing
from these entities.
114
Fixed rates, the utility’s
costs by using electricity at efficient times.
natural monopoly in an area, and the inability to easily move consumption away from peak periods gave consumers few incentives to
change consumption habits or locate alternative generators.
Technological change, the demand for cleaner sources, and the
increasing economic viability of renewables have slowly changed utility and consumer behavior and have enabled some movement toward
the type of energy system that would meet a variety of public values,
such as affordable and clean energy. Some consumers have begun to
demand options for purchasing electricity generated from wind or so115
lar sources, for example, or for real time pricing, in which electricity

110. For a thorough discussion of the problems associated with the lack of regional or
federal authority over transmission siting authority, see Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth
Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65
VANDERBILT L. REV. 1801 (2012).
111. Spence, supra note 82, at 769.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 770, 772 (explaining that distribution is a natural monopoly and historically
was provided by vertically integrated utilities and regulated as a natural monopoly).
114. Cf. Elias L. Quinn & Adam L. Reed, Envisioning the Smart Grid: Network Architecture,
Information Control, and the Public Policy Balancing Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 833, 871 (2010)
(describing real-time prices and other measures that would reduce customer use of electricity and utilities’ disincentives to implement these types of schemes).
115. See, e.g., PG&E Proposes Option for Customers to Choose 100% Renewable Energy, N. AM.
WINDPOWER (Apr. 25, 2012) [hereinafter PG&E Proposes 100% Renewable Energy],
http://www.nawindpower.com/e107_plugins/content/content.php?content.9747

(de-

scribing Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s proposed wind and solar energy certificate
program).
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prices change depending on how many people are demanding it at a
116
given time. State legislatures and public utility and service commis117
Old
sions, in turn, have begun to enable these types of options.
traditions remain, however; certain lingering long-term contracts, the
powerful incentives for utilities to block transmission access, and consumers’ lack of familiarity with more flexible usage and pricing
schemes for electricity largely perpetuate an antiquated and entrenched system. These long-standing, hard-to-change aspects of
markets provide significant barriers to efforts at framing regulation
and institutions to support needed evolution.
C. Regulatory
The combination of physical and market challenges highlighted
in Parts I.A and I.B combine to create daunting regulatory challenges
in an energy system that needs more flexibility in generation and access to transmission, more consumer options, and, as always, a continuous and adequate supply of electricity. These challenges largely
fall to federal and local entities, which often are not fully equipped
with the jurisdictional reach or the governance capacity to fully address them. Although energy resources are distributed unequally
around the world, and markets for them are increasingly transnational, these resources are primarily regulated at a national or subnational
level due to the international law principle of state sovereignty over
natural resources. This principle both gives the United States property rights to and control over its land-based and offshore energy resources, and makes it dependent on the other countries with energy
118
resources that it needs.
116. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions: Real-Time Pricing, GALVIN ELEC. INITIATIVE,
http://www.galvinpower.org/power-consumers/act/real-time-illinois/faq (last visited Jan.
14, 2013) (“[R]eal-time pricing gives consumers information about the actual cost of electricity at any given time [and] lets consumers adjust their electricity usage . . . for example,
scheduling usage during periods of low demand to pay cheaper rates.”).
117. See, e.g., PG&E Proposes 100% Renewable Energy, supra note 115; see also RPS Policies,
supra note 88 (showing renewable portfolio standards and goals for various states and territories).
118. See Robert Dufresne, The Opacity of Oil: Oil Corporations, Internal Violence, and International Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 331, 350–56 (2004); Melaku Geboye Desta, OPEC
Production Management Practices Under WTO Law and the Antitrust Law of Non-OPEC Countries,
28 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 439, 453–55 (2010); cf. GEORGE ELIAN, THE PRINCIPLE
OF

SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES (1979); NICO SCHRIJVER, SOVEREIGNTY OVER

NATURAL RESOURCES: BALANCING RIGHTS AND DUTIES (1997); Hari M. Osofsky, Learning
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Within the United States, a number of local, regional, federal,
and state regulations, standards, and quasi-formal governance
schemes shape the physical structure of America’s energy system and
intervene in the market forces described above. These public controls also provide unique market opportunities, such as the construction of new transmission lines and the addition of smart grid technologies, which can enable new generation sources to connect to the
grid and empower consumers to influence the type, quantity, and
119
price of electricity they consume.
Local and state governments have broad control over the choice
of fuel used to produce electricity and the type of generation facilities
constructed. For example, a growing number of cities and states have
required a certain percentage of electricity to come from renewable

from Environmental Justice: A New Model for International Environmental Rights, 24 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 71 (2005); Annecoos Wiersema, A Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of
Law and Goals in Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239, 1283 n.261
(2008).
119. Multi-level public-private collaborations, such as those in the new greenhouse gas
emissions standards for motor vehicles, similarly shape the evolving transportation side of
the energy sector. Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s National Auto Policy: Lessons
from the “Car Deal,” 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343 (2011); Hari Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism
and Climate Change: Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237 (2011)
[hereinafter Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism]. The government also subsidizes desired transformative developments at times, such as providing royalties concessions to oil companies
engaged in offshore drilling; these incentives impact the type, rate, and location of primary fuel extraction for transportation and heating, for example, as well as for electricity
generation. Outer Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act of 1995, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1337(a)(1) & (a)(3)(C) (2006). The Fifth Circuit has upheld this scheme. Kerr-McGee
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Interior, 554 F.3d 1082, 1086–87 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Keith
B. Hall, Mineral Law: Outer Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act, 57 LA. B.J. 53
(2009).

For criticism and limited reform of the royalty scheme, see U.S. GOV’T

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-682T, ROYALTIES COLLECTION: ONGOING PROBLEMS
WITH INTERIOR’S

EFFORTS TO ENSURE A FAIR RETURN FOR TAXPAYERS REQUIRE ATTENTION

7–8 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07682t.pdf; DEP’T OF INTERIOR,
REFORMING MMS: JANUARY 2009–PRESENT (2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/
deepwaterhorizon/upload/05-07-10-reform-fact-sheet.pdf. Given this Article’s emphasis
on the electricity sector and the above-described previous scholarly analysis of multi-scalar
dynamics in regulating the transportation sector, however, this Section focuses primarily
on the electricity context.
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120

sources.
These requirements force utilities, over time, to change
generation sources even if they have to abandon beneficial long-term
121
Local and state governcontracts with fossil fuel-based generators.
ments also affect the type of generation chosen through their regulation of utility rates or through direct mandates for generation. City
councils sometimes direct municipally owned utilities, for example, to
122
build new renewable generation, whereas states that regulate utility
rates tend to only approve affordable construction projects that keep
123
rates down. Through renewable portfolio standards and other decisions about the energy generation mix, state and local governments
directly or indirectly require the construction of new transmission to
connect renewable generation to the utilities that must purchase it.
Texas has gone the furthest in this regard, requiring its Public Utility
Commission to select utilities to build high-priority transmission lines
to wind generation built under the state’s renewable portfolio stand124
ard.
Federal entities also influence generation choice by governing
core elements of the transportation of fuels and electricity. For example, FERC approves the location of interstate gas pipelines and has
120. For a description of city initiatives for renewables in the most populous areas, see
Garrick Pursley & Hannah Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 959, Table 1 (2011).
121. Governments often mitigate the impacts of abandoning long-term contracts by
allowing utilities to recover their stranded costs, or at least a portion of these costs,
through the rates that they charge. See, e.g., William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, Stranded
Costs, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 835, 848 (1995) (arguing in favor of allowing recovery
and describing FERC’s ruling allowing recovery of stranded costs but requiring utilities to
mitigate their stranded investment obligation).
122. See supra note 120.
123. See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald & Tom Zeller, Jr., Cost of Tapping Green Power Makes Projects a Tougher Sell, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2010, at A1 (describing how state regulators rejected
a Virginia utility’s contract to purchase power from a wind farm, “citing the recession and
the lower prices of natural gas and other fossil fuels”).
124. S.B. 20 § 3(g)(2), 79th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2005), available at
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/791/billtext/pdf/SB00020F.pdf. On the transportation side, which is not the focus of this Article, cities make decisions regarding their own
vehicle fleet and land use planning that shape both the choice of and overall usage patterns regarding transportation fuels. See Hari M. Osofsky, Suburban Climate Change Efforts:
Possibilities for Small and Nimble Cities Participating in State, Regional, National, and International Networks, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2013); Katherine A. Trisolini, All
Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential for Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation,
62 STAN. L. REV. 669, 744–45 (2010).
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jurisdiction over wholesale gas prices (typically now tied to market
rates) and the price charged by pipelines for transporting natural
125
This federal regulation affects power plants’ access to an ingas.
creasingly sought-after fuel source. FERC also influences the ability of
renewable generators to sell their product due to its control over
transmission services, including the rate that operators may charge for
these services, the means of allocating rates, and the conditions that
126
they may impose on generators waiting to connect to the grid.
In 1996, FERC ordered that vertically integrated utilities functionally separate their transmission services from distribution and
generation and offer open access to their transmission lines on a first127
When this failed to solve the transmission
come, first-served basis.
bottleneck, FERC attempted to require the regionalization of transmission. To do this, it strongly encouraged the formation of organizations with regional control of the transmission grid—originally
called independent system operators (“ISOs”) and later regional
128
transmission organizations (“RTOs”), entities that Hybrid Energy Gov129
These organizations, where they
ernance discusses in more depth.
have been formed, apply to FERC for a unified transmission “tariff”—
a document that sets the rate that the organization may charge for
130
transmission service and prescribes the conditions of that service.
Regional transmission organizations then operate the transmission
131
grid and plan for necessary upgrades. In one of their most contentious roles, they plan for new transmission capacity and decide how to

125. See Natural Gas, Commission’s Responsibilities, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N
[hereinafter Natural Gas, FERC], http://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas.asp (last visited Feb.
17, 2013) (describing FERC’s responsibilities and procedures for regulating the construction of pipelines and establishing rates for pipeline service). This power originally comes
from 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2006) (enacted 1938) (granting federal authority over “transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce” and “the sale in interstate commerce of natural
gas for resale”).
126. Cf. Natural Gas, FERC, supra note 125.
127. FERC Order No. 888 (Final Rule, issued Apr. 24, 1996), available at
www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/rm95-8-00w.txt.
128. See id. at 52. (encouraging ISOs); FERC Order No. 2000, at 1, 70–72 (Final Rule,
issued Dec. 20, 1999), available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/transplan.asp (encouraging RTOs).
129. See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 17.
130. FERC Order No. 888, supra note 127, at 4.
131. FERC Order No. 2000, supra note 128, at 323–24.
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allocate transmission rates among utilities to cover this new capaci132
133
ty —leading the Seventh Circuit to strike down one scheme and
134
FERC to update its standards for RTO cost recovery.
Beyond setting rates and service standards for RTOs and other
transmission operators, FERC also determines interconnection requirements, including how operators must prioritize and review generators’ requests to connect to the lines and the conditions that they
135
FERC has written
may impose on newly interconnected sources.
specific interconnection standards for large wind generators in an effort to open up transmission access for this growing source yet also
136
ensure reliable grid operation.
Although FERC affects generation choices through its control
over pipelines and transmission services, states and local governments
have an equally strong role in electricity transportation decisions.
Municipal or state governments generally control transmission-siting
137
processes and can block projects by refusing proposed locations. A
small number of regional organizations have emerged to facilitate
138
transmission siting and planning for future expansions, but local
139
entities have been hesitant to cede meaningful authority to them.
States also have unique authority over the electricity sold by a
utility directly to consumers. Historically, states granted utilities ex-

132. Id.
133. Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 576 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir.
2009).
134. See FERC Order No. 1000-B (Order on Rehearing and Clarification, issued Oct.
18, 2012), available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/trans-plan.asp
(updating RTO planning and cost allocation requirements).
135. See, e.g., FERC Order No. 2003-C (Order on Rehearing, issued June 16, 2005),
available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/order2003.asp (providing
interconnection standards for large generators).
136. FERC Order No. 661-A (Order on Rehearing and Clarification, issued Dec. 12,
2005), available at http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20051212171744-RM05-4001.pdf.
137. For a description of siting regimes in some of the western states, see Brown & Rossi, supra note 105, at 713–19.
138. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 110, at 1867–69 (discussing regional siting agencies).
139. See id. at 740, 748 (describing how many state transmission siting regimes remain
antiquated and focus on local issues such as local environmental impacts, and describing
cost allocation as a major impediment to regional transmission governance and planning).
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clusive access to service territories in exchange for comprehensive
140
regulation. States set the rates that utilities could charge customers,
limited utilities’ ability to immediately disconnect service for customers who could not pay, and regulated a variety of other aspects of ser141
States also controlled the types of
vice, such as billing disclosure.
generation built by utilities and the types of electricity purchased
from generators. This system remains in place in a number of areas,
142
but restructuring in a handful of states has substantially changed it.
In Texas, for example, in regions where sufficient competition
among generators has developed, the state has separated the genera143
This separation altion, transmission, and distribution functions.
lows it to introduce competition in generation—and to some extent
in distribution—while maintaining monopoly treatment of transmission. Power generation companies now compete for customers, and
retail electric providers (“REPs”) offer an interface between custom144
Retail electric providers approach customers
ers and generators.
with a variety of generation packages and arrange for a transmission
and distribution service provider to connect the generator to the re145
The state continues to at least minimally regulate
tail customer.
each of these entities: Power generation companies must apply for a
license, for example, and retail electric providers must provide certain
notice to customers and, like historic vertically integrated utilities,
providers must follow certain procedures in connecting and discon146
In contrast, transmission
necting customers from power services.
and the portion of the distribution market covered by distribution

140. Bradley, supra note 77.
141. Spence, supra note 82, at 769 & n.22.
142. See WARWICK, supra note 53, at 6.1–6.5 & fig.6.2 (describing utility restructuring).
143. SUSAN COMBS, TEXAS COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, WINDOW ON STATE
GOVERNMENT: ENERGY REPORT—ELECTRICITY, available at http://www.window.state.tx.us/
specialrpt/energy/uses/electricity.php (last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
144. See Retail Electric Providers, TEX. ELEC. CHOICE EDUC. PROGRAM, http://powerto
choose.org/_content/_compare/companylist.aspx (last visited July 11, 2012) (describing
REP functions).
145. Power to Choose: Electricity Basics, TEX. ELEC. CHOICE EDUC. PROGRAM, http://power
tochoose.org/_content/_about/electricity_basics.asp (last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
146. See Certification and Licensing, PUB. UTIL. COMM’N OF TEX., http://www.puc.state.tx.
us/industry/electric/business/rep/Rep.aspx (last visited July 11, 2012) (describing responsibilities and certification and licensing procedures for retail electric providers).
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service providers, both of which Texas still views as having a natural
147
monopoly, still operate under state-approved rates.
Together, the physical, market, and regulatory elements of the
U.S. secondary energy system form a complex system. Any efforts to
change the system or improve its governance must navigate the nuances of this tripartite structure. As discussed in the Part that follows,
the nature of this system creates complicated federalism dynamics
among and within levels of governance as multiple entities are granted partial authority over critical decisions.
II. THE NEED FOR A DYNAMIC CONCEPTION OF ENERGY FEDERALISM
As the analysis in Part I illustrates, the regulatory apparatus applicable to the U.S. energy system is tremendously complex, with
many different types of laws, institutions, and actors operating at multiple levels of government. The problem of multi-level governance is
not new and has long been addressed in the United States under the
rubric of “federalism.” From before the founding of this country
through the present, both scholars and policymakers have debated
the best way to organize regulatory authority across multiple levels of
government. The vast majority of this scholarship focuses on “scale
matching”: people argue over which level of government, usually state
or federal, is best suited to address a particular issue. Energy law
scholarship has followed this tradition for the most part, with many
articles devoted to examining which level of government is most appropriate for a particular sub-part of energy law, such as transmission
148
149
siting or renewable portfolio standards.
While respecting the contribution that the current energy law
scholarship makes to particular federalism questions, this Part argues
that a more dynamic and holistic model is needed. In numerous substantive areas, especially environmental law, there has been increasing
scholarly analysis of federalism in dynamic terms, which helps connect
150
Very little of this dyfederalism to broader governance concerns.
namic federalism literature, however, has infused analyses of energy
federalism. This Part proposes a model for doing so.

147. Transmission and Distribution Providers, ERCOT, http://www.ercot.com/services/rq
/tdsp/ (last visited July 31, 2012).
148. See infra note 152.
149. See infra note 151.
150. For a discussion of this development, see Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of
Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 159–61 (2006).
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set individual, and highly varied, standards and goals. Other scholarship similarly discusses how effective and appropriate an expansion
152
of federal transmission siting authority would be.
With these rather narrow applications of federalism to energy,
and a tendency to rely on traditional federalism principles within
these applications, energy law has largely failed to incorporate a more
dynamic version of federalism that is emerging in other substantive
153
Traditional federalism scholarship focuses on spatial relaareas.
tionships among levels of governance in a limited way: it concentrates
on interactions along a vertical axis (the local to the federal), asking
which level of government is most appropriate and how concurrent
authority at more than one level of government should be shared. A
rapidly developing stream of federalism scholarship, however, has
moved beyond these static views of multi-level relationships and has
begun to recognize the complex interactions among governmental
and nongovernmental actors. As Hari Osofsky has analyzed in previous work, a rich scholarly literature in federalism and other areas explores multiple iterations of regulatory structures that cut across tradi154
tional governance divisions.
151. For example, a 2010 volume of the Connecticut Law Review contained several articles analyzing the benefits, limitations, and political viability of a national renewable portfolio standard. See, e.g., Lincoln L. Davis, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42
CONN. L. REV. 1339 (2010); Joshua P. Fershee, Moving Power Forward: Creating a ForwardLooking Energy Policy Based on a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1405 (2010); Lynn M. Fountain, Johnny-Come-Lately: Practical Considerations of a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1475
(2010); Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, 42 CONN. L. REV.
1425 (2010); David B. Spence, The Political Barriers to a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1451
(2010).
152. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority,
39 ENVTL. L. 1015 (2009).
153. We discuss the limited set of scholarship bringing dynamic federalism into energy
law supra notes 162–170 and accompanying text.
154. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism, supra note 119 (describing the multi-level publicprivate collaborations in the new greenhouse gas emissions standards for motor vehicles).
As Hari Osofsky has discussed in prior work, dynamic federalism intersects with many other streams of scholarship in multiple disciplines, such as network theory, scale theory,
complexity theory, and adaptive management. Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1077 (2011) [hereinafter Osofsky, BP Oil Spill]. This Article acknowledges those synergies but focuses specifically on dynamic federalism to highlight the ways in which those spatial dynamics intersect with
governance challenges.
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Specifically, the literature on dynamic federalism’s treatment of
the vertical axis has moved beyond traditional state-federal questions
to multi-layered models that integrate actors from the smallest indi155
vidual level to the largest international one. “Federalism” for these
scholars has come to encompass not simply federal-state-local interac156
tions, but also simultaneous interactions among multiple govern-

155. For examples looking at the very small individual and local scales, see Sarah Krakoff, Planetary Identity Formation and the Relocalization of Environmental Law, 64 FLA. L. REV.
87 (2012); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Jack Barkenbus & Jonathan Gilligan, Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1701, 1703 (2008). For examples of
discussions that integrate domestic federalism questions with international law, see Robert
B. Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs, International Law, and the New Federalism: Lessons from Coordination,
73 MO. L. REV. 1185, 1186–87 (2008); Robert B. Ahdieh et. al., When Subnational Meets International: The Politics and Place of City, State, and Province in the World, 102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L
L. PROC. 339, 340 (2008); Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance: The
Changing Nature of Modern Jurisdiction, 57 EMORY L.J. 1, 1–4 (2007); Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 863–71 (2006); Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette A.
Meyler, Like a Nation State, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1621, 1623–25 (2008); Judith Resnik, Law’s
Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115
YALE L.J. 1564, 1669–70 (2006); Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681, 681 (2008); Tseming
Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global Environmental Law, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615,
618 (2009).
156. Robert Percival has traced the emergence of environmental federalism in the
United States, and some of the traditional debates that took place. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141 (1995).
For an example of more traditional debates over top-down versus bottom-up models based
on ideas of “race to the top” versus “race to the bottom theories of regulation, compare
Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “to the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 274–79 (1997) (top down), Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 572 (1996) (same), Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only from a National Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 7
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 225, 230–31 (1997) (same); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity
and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 67, 69 (1996) (same), with Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R.
Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 23, 25–26 (1996) (bottom up); Richard L. Revesz, The Race
to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535,
535–36 (1997) (same); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
“Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210,
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157

ance levels along the vertical axis.
Moreover, as discussed in more
depth in Part III, dynamic conceptions of shared governance often
extend well beyond questions of concurrent authority to include
evolving patterns of complicated relationships. Federal-state, localstate, and regional-local relationships often all occur simultaneously
within one institution and change over time.
Dynamic federalism also at times moves beyond the primary focus on the vertical axis that dominates traditional accounts. Some of
these scholars include interactions among key actors at a single level
of governance as part of federalism. This horizontal dynamic federalism literature brings the role of intra-level regulatory relationships into clearer focus. For example, Noah Hall has argued that the Great
Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Compact, which includes eight Great
Lakes states, uses a cooperative horizontal federalism approach that

1210–12 (1992) (same); Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2040–41 (1993) (same).
157. Kirsten Engel has given a helpful exposition of this evolution in an environmental
context. Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law,
56 EMORY L.J. 159, 176 (2006). For an earlier exploration of dynamic federalism in a corporate law context, see Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 109 (2004). For additional conceptualization of
dynamic approaches, see ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN (2012);
ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009); Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV.
863, 879–83 (2006); Craig Anthony Arnold, The Structure of the Land Use Regulatory System in
the United States, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 441, 446 (2007); William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547,
1549–50 (2007) [hereinafter Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation]; William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 49–51 (2003)
[hereinafter Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons]; Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism
and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2009); Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering
States When It Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1328–32
(2004); Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV.
879, 881 (2008); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59, 66 (2010); Erin
Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 5 (2011). For examples of symposia dedicated to exploring these federalism models, see Symposium, Interactive Federalism: Filling the
Gaps?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1 (2006); Symposium, The New Federalism: Plural Governance in a Decentered World, 57 EMORY L.J. 1 (2007).
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promotes flexibility while minimizing incentives to under regulate.
In a broader substantive context, Allan Erbsen and others have provided models for analyzing the way in which horizontal and vertical
159
federalism dynamics interact.
In addition to analyzing vertical and horizontal relationships
among government entities in a more nuanced way, the dynamic federalism literature unpacks existing characterizations of regulatory levels; even when an approach is defined as existing at a particular level,
such as within the jurisdiction of the federal government, the literature recognizes that such a characterization may be incomplete, and
that relationships often shift over time. For example, Ann Carlson
has explored the iterative dynamics that move policy forward as the
160
Erin
state and federal government cooperate and clash over time.
Ryan has considered the role of negotiation in creating these interactions, noting that state and federal officials at times negotiate schemes
that are “federal” in name only—rejecting a system that would lodge
161
all power at one level or another. This nuanced treatment of crosscutting relationships—those that bridge levels of governance, substantive areas of the law, public/private, or other institutional divisions—
has implications for governance, which Part III explores in more
depth.
A few scholars have begun discussing energy law issues in these
types of dynamic terms, but that scholarship, like the above-described
more traditional energy federalism work, is all in relatively narrow
contexts. Most critically for this Article’s analysis, none of it develops
an overarching conceptual model for energy federalism. For example, as part of a broader analysis of agency coordination questions in
administrative law, Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi provide examples of
162
interagency coordination tools from energy law. Ashira Ostrow has
developed a dynamic federalism model she terms “process preemp158. Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Management in the
Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405 (2006).
159. Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493 (2008); see also Osofsky,
Diagonal Federalism, supra note 119.
160. Carlson, supra note 157.
161. See Ryan, supra note 157, at 20 (noting that “[s]ome forms of federalism . . . partner different federal, state, and local actors from across the different branches on both
sides of the line in an elaborate process with multiple stages of iterative exchange—such as
negotiated federal lawmaking over policy”).
162. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1131 (2012).
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tion” in the context of renewable energy siting. In their analysis of
transmission, Alexandra Klass and Elizabeth Wilson also reference the
dynamic federalism literature, and draw some models from it, includ164
ing Ostrow’s. Ann Carlson has argued for a cross-cutting federalism
approach to energy efficiency standards for appliances modeled on
165
the hybrid approach used in the automobile emissions context.
Robin Kundis Craig, in turn, has taken a dynamic federalism approach to exploring the nexus of water, climate change, and energy
166
law, and Hannah Wiseman has argued for the expansion of regional
renewable energy governance to address commons and anticommons
167
With Garrick Pursley, Wiseman also has examproblems in siting.
ined the possibilities for expanding municipal powers in that con168
text. In the fuel extraction context, David Spence has explored the
need for flexible considerations of federalism in the governance of
hydraulic fracturing, describing demands for rapid response to new
169
risks and assessing the ideal governance levels for this response. Finally, Hari Osofsky has proposed a dynamic federalism model for understanding the complex regulatory interactions around offshore
drilling regulation and spill clean-up that occurred in the context of
170
the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
This Article argues that the complex and evolutionary understanding of governance explored in the dynamic federalism scholarship could contribute to a more systematic approach to regulating
energy than current energy federalism scholarship provides. A dynamic federalism approach is particularly well-suited to energy law
because of the complex tripartite structure described in Part I. While
163. Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 289, 290 (2011).
164. Klass & Wilson, supra note 110.
165. Ann E. Carlson, Energy Efficiency and Federalism, 1 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY
L. 11, 12 (2009).
166. Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting Water Federalism to Climate Change Impacts: Energy Policy, Food Security, and the Allocation of Water Resources, 5 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 183,
186–87 (2010).
167. Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Governance, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 477, 486 (2011).
168. Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 882
(2011).
169. David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (2013).
170. Osofsky, supra note 154, at 1079.
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detailed analyses of particular areas of energy law are important to
understanding the nuances of those areas, traditional federalism approaches focused on solely choosing between the state and federal
government may not adequately capture crucial dynamics among the
system’s physical, market, and regulatory aspects.
Dynamic federalism, with its more complete spatialization of critical relationships, helps to ensure that this fuller understanding is incorporated into regulatory proposals. It also fosters regulatory proposals that consider key stakeholders beyond just the state and federal
governments and that employ innovative governance methods. Specifically, the vertical and horizontal axes of our dynamic federalism
model for energy—discussed in depth in Part II.B—consider how entities interact across levels of government, within levels of government, and simultaneously across and within levels of government.
Understanding these relationships more systematically across many
areas of energy law helps to illuminate shared governance challenges
and possibilities for institutional innovation discussed in Part III and
the Conclusion.
B. Mapping Dynamic Federalism Interactions in the Energy System
This Section applies the dynamic federalism theory of the previous Section—a theory that exists largely outside of energy law—by
mapping the spatial dynamics of energy regulation. This Section describes the patterns of relationships that these institutions have across
different areas of energy law.
To do so, this Section employs the vertical and horizontal axes
discussed in Part II.A to trace complex interactions among governmental and nongovernmental actors. First, it examines vertical relationships among actors at more than one level of government, including both the traditional state-federal interactions and additional
171
Like other dynamic federalism accounts, it seeks to capture
ones.
the complicated interplay among stakeholders rather than just focusing on state, federal, and concurrent authority. Second, it explores
the horizontal dimensions of these relationships, with a discussion of
the ways in which a variety of actors at each level of government inter172
act in the energy system.
In reality, interactions are rarely solely vertical or horizontal.
Many of this Section’s examples include simultaneous interactions

171. See infra Part II.B.1.
172. See infra Part II.B.2.
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across both axes. For example, when a group of states form a regional collaboration, their interaction is horizontal, but they have added a
new vertical layer in the form of a regional entity. Breaking out the
vertical and horizontal elements of the relationships across energy law
however, helps to illuminate the complicated nature of energy federalism and reveal important patterns, including lessons for the future
formation of energy institutions and improvement of existing ones.
Together, these two sets of interacting spatial dynamics frame governance challenges for the energy system, which are the subject of Part
III.
1. Vertical
In energy governance, most vertical interactions occur among
federal-regional, regional-state, and federal-state actors, with a variety
of actors at each of these levels interacting with many actors at levels
below or above them. These actors include: at the national level,
Congress, FERC, and national associations that report to FERC; at the
regional level, RTOs/ISOs, entities created by groups of states or their
public utility commissions (such as state organizations that comment
on RTO decisions), and federal and state actors operating within
compacts; at the state level, legislatures, public utility commissions,
and other state energy and environmental agencies; and at the local
level, entities that make land use planning decisions and individual
regulated entities, which at times are city or state-based but often have
173
multi-state operations occurring under a larger parent company.
We consider activities by utilities and their subunits to be part of “governance” because utilities, including privately owned businesses, are
key actors within several formal governing institutions, such as NERC
and RTOs/ISOs, and they implement a number of requirements im174
A dynamic approach is
posed by FERC, RTOs/ISOs, and NERC.
helpful to exploring these relationships because they change based
on substantive context and over time.
Although major federal statutes address different aspects of the
energy system, they vary significantly in how they balance larger and
smaller scale authority. In the context of electricity, state public utility
commissions and state and local land use bodies largely control most

173. See RAP GUIDE, supra note 51, at 9–23 (explaining the structure of the electric industry and FERC).
174. See, e.g., id. at 67–68 (explaining the rules issued by FERC with which utilities must
comply).

816

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:773
175

important aspects of generation, transmission, and distribution,
with the exception of FERC authority over the terms and rates of
176
This dominant small-scale control
wholesale transmission service.
can create difficult vertical dynamics. Ashira Ostrow, for example, has
explored the ways in which state and local jurisdiction makes renewable energy siting harder because of communities’ unwillingness to
bear the burdens of generation, and has drawn from telecommunica177
Ashley
tions law to argue for a process preemption approach.
Brown and Jim Rossi, and Alexandra Klass and Elizabeth Wilson, have
explored similar concerns in the context of new transmission lines—
many of which would help bring renewable energy onto the grid—
where FERC and regional transmission organizations have tried to
address the need for interstate lines that state-by-state public utility
178
Despite the Energy Policy Act of
commission approval often stalls.
179
2005 establishing National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors,
the Department of Energy has not yet been able to successfully com180
plete such designations due to Ninth and Fourth Circuit rulings,

175. See Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 259 (2011)
(describing state siting regimes); David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, The Transformation of
Energy Markets and the Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. REV. 131, 149 (2012) (showing that
approximately three-quarters of the states still regulate retail electricity (distribution) as a
natural monopoly).
176. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2006) (“The provisions of this subchapter shall apply to the
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at
wholesale in interstate commerce . . . .”).
177. Ostrow, supra note 163.
178. Brown & Rossi, supra note 105; Klass & Wilson, supra note 110.
179. 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a) (2006).
180. Piedmont Envtl. Council v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 558 F.3d 304, 313
(4th Cir. 2009) (concluding that although 16 U.S.C. § 216(b)(1)(C)(i) authorizes FERC to
issue permits when a state has “‘withheld approval for more than 1 year after the filing of
[a permit] application,’” it “does not give FERC permitting authority when a state has affirmatively denied a permit within the one-year deadline.” (alteration in original)); California Wilderness Coal. v. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1086–87 (9th Cir. 2011) (declining to adopt DOE’s interpretation of section 216, which would only have required noticeand-comment proceedings to fulfill the “consultation” requirement, and instead concluding that Congress intended for DOE “to confer with the affected states” before engaging in
a study that might ultimately result in limitations on the states’ authority).
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and most key transmission decisions still occur at a state level through
181
public utility commissions—and to some extent, at a regional level.
In other areas of energy law, however, opposite vertical dynamics
dominate. For example, the federal government controls the siting
and construction of interstate pipelines and all liquefied natural gas
182
terminals in the natural gas context, wielding substantial authority
183
Similarly,
over their size, location, and environmental effects.
deepwater drilling and oil spill clean-up are largely governed by federal statutes and federal inter-agency collaboration, even though they
involve multiple scales of government. The Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act (“OCSLA”) and Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”),
building out of the federalism arrangement created in the Submerged Lands Act (“SLA”), designate the federal government as the
184
The Compreregulator for drilling far off the coast in deepwater.
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (“CERCLA”) and its amendments likewise create the basis for
the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
Plan (“NCP”), which governs responses to deepwater spills like the
185
2010 Deepwater Horizon one.

181. FERC has at times tried to create institutional mechanisms for addressing these
issues, such as encouraging the creation of regional transmission organizations in Order
2000 or mandating that public utilities participate in open and transparent planning processes in Order 890. FERC Order No. 2000, supra note 128, at 3; FERC Order 890, at 3
(Final Rule, issued Feb. 16, 2007), available at http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/commmeet/2007/021507/E-1.pdf.
182. See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)(1)(A) (2006) (prohibiting “the construction or extension
of any [pipeline] facilities” without a FERC certificate of public convenience and necessity); 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1) (2006) (“The Commission shall have the exclusive authority to
approve or deny an application for the siting, construction, expansion, or operation of an
LNG terminal.”).
183. See, e.g., Guidance for Applicant-Prepared Draft Environmental Assessments for Certain
Proposed Natural Gas Projects, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, at 1 (April 28, 2011),
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/enviro/draft-ea-guidance.pdf (explaining that FERC
prepares environmental assessments under the National Environmental Policy Act for “all
proposed natural gas projects”).
184. See Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–66 (2006); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–56a (2006); Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§
1301–15 (2006) (as amended); see also Rachael E. Salcido, Offshore Federalism and Ocean Industrialization, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1355, 1379–82 (2008).
185. 40 C.F.R. § 300.2 (2011). The regulation states:
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Finally, some energy law establishes hybrid structures in which
neither federal nor state and local governance dominates. We analyze
these structures in depth in Hybrid Energy Governance to assess their effectiveness in navigating federalism complexity and its resulting gov186
ernance challenges. For example, although FERC has federal control over interstate transmission rates and service, much of the
operation of transmission lines occurs at the regional level, through
187
Any transmission utility that
regional transmission organizations.
joins an approved RTO does not have to receive an individual transmission tariff from FERC, which would establish the rate that the utili188
Inty could charge and the service conditions that it must follow.
stead, by becoming a member of the RTO, the utility is immediately
subject to a complex regional regime and tariff, in which members
independent of transmission owners and generators set the rules for
189
daily grid operations and the electricity market enabled by the grid.
The NCP is required by section 105 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. [§] 9605, as amended
by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub.
L. 99–499, (hereinafter CERCLA), and by section 311(d) of the Clean Water Act
(CWA), 33 U.S.C. [§] 1321(d), as amended by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
(OPA), Pub. L. 101–380. In Executive Order (E.O.) 12777 (56 FR 54757, October 22, 1991), the President delegated to the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) the responsibility for the amendment of the NCP. Amendments to the
NCP are coordinated with members of the National Response Team (NRT) prior to publication for notice and comment. This includes coordination with the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission in order to avoid inconsistent or duplicative requirements in the
emergency planning responsibilities of those agencies. The NCP is applicable to
response actions taken pursuant to the authorities under CERCLA and section
311 of the CWA, as amended.
Id.
186. Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 17.
187. See The Honorable Joseph T. Kelliher & Maria Farinella, The Changing Landscape of
Federal Energy Law, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 611, 615 (2009) (“Large parts of the interstate power
grid are operated by regional transmission organizations and independent system operators, some of which also operate centralized power auctions.”).
188. See FERC Order No. 2000, supra note 128, at 190–94 (describing the importance of
RTO independence from individual utilities that join the RTO and the attendant need for
the RTO to have the sole authority to file a transmission tariff).
189. See id. at 323–497 (describing the functions of an RTO, including tariff administration, congestion management, and market monitoring).
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Although the RTO operates under its own tariff issued by FERC, it has
a great deal of latitude in choosing the mechanisms for daily grid op190
eration and long-term transmission planning.
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”),
191
a quasi-public association that writes grid reliability standards, also
intermixes federal, regional, state, and local lines in its institutional
192
Despite the recent addition of FERC review authoriconstruction.
193
ty, NERC largely relies on regional sub-institutions (regional entities) to write and enforce standards for electric reliability, which require, for example, that utilities follow procedures to prevent
sabotage of transmission lines and to avoid generation failures that
194
could cause voltage swings. NERC members—consisting of investorowned utilities, municipalities that own and operate utilities, power
marketers, state public utility commissions, and industrial and indi195
vidual electricity end-users —all vote on proposed reliability stand196
ards before passing them on to FERC for final approval.
A dynamic energy federalism model therefore must recognize
multiple, simultaneous interactions among numerous players along a
vertical axis, and, as discussed in Part III, complex relationships
among these actors: NERC—a regional institution, for example—
190. See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 17 (manuscript at 49–50) (describing the functions of RTOs).
191. About NERC: Company Overview, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.
com/page.php?cid=1|7 (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
192. See About NERC: Key Players, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.com
/page.php?cid=1|9 (last visited Nov. 5, 2012) (describing the entities with which “NERC
regularly interacts,” including governmental authorities, regional entities, and industry).
193. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, 16 U.S.C. § 824(o)(b)(1) (2006) (giving FERC the
authority to regulate reliability).
194. See Standards: Reliability Standards: CIP-002-3 to CIP-009-3, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY
CORP., http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=2|20 (follow “Critical Infrastructure Protection” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 5, 2012) (requiring “Critical Cyber Asset Identification,”
“Security Management Controls,” Personnel Training,” “Electronic Security Perimeters,”
“Physical Security of Critical Cyber Assets,” “Systems Security Management,” “Incident Reporting and Response Planning,” and “Recovery Plans for Critical Cyber Assets”).
195. Governance: Members, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.com/page.
php?cid=1|8|118 (last accessed Nov. 5, 2012) (explaining that NERC membership is “open
to any person or entity with an interest in the reliable operation of the North American
bulk power system”).
196. For a more in-depth discussion of these processes, see Osofsky & Wiseman, supra
note 17 (manuscript at 38–39).
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proposes reliability standards to FERC in a bottom-up process, and
197
FERC ultimately approves them; NERC and its subunits also enforce
many of the standards themselves, with FERC holding review authori198
ty. The power within these vertical interactions does not always flow
first from the top down, and, as also described in more detail in Part
III, it often involves conflict and cooperation; state members of an
RTO sometimes support the RTO’s proposals to FERC for transmission service changes or expanded transmission, for example, and at
199
other times oppose them. A dynamic energy federalism model captures these many nuances of vertical institutional relationships.
2. Horizontal
Intergovernmental interactions do not simply occur across different jurisdictional levels. Often, more than one governmental entity at a particular level plays an important role in energy decisionmaking, which makes the dynamic federalism literature with a horizontal focus salient to energy. Horizontal federalism issues arise in
the energy system in numerous contexts and at many levels of governance. For example, at the federal level, FERC works with a number of
other federal agencies in the gas pipeline siting and construction context by coordinating the various approvals that are required for pipelines, such as biological opinions from the Fish and Wildlife Service if
endangered or threatened species might be affected by construc200
To perform this coordinating function, FERC issues a schedtion.

197. See 18 C.F.R. § 39.5 (2012) (explaining the process through which reliability
standard proposals and modifications are submitted, considered, and approved).
198. See 18 C.F.R. § 39.7 (2012) (describing the roles of NERC and its regional entities
in enforcing reliability standards and reporting violations to FERC).
199. See infra text accompanying note 278.
200. FERC Order No. 687, at 2–3 & n.4 (Final Rule, issued Oct. 19, 2006),
http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/101906/C-2.pdf. FERC states that any “recommendations and opinions . . . necessary for a federal agency . . . to reach a decision on a
request for a federal authorization that is needed for a proposed [pipeline or LNG project] to go forward” will be coordinated by FERC. Id. at n.4. If an endangered or threatened species would potentially be jeopardized by the pipeline, it appears that a Fish and
Wildlife Service biological opinion would be “necessary” and that FERC therefore could
set a deadline for the completion of this opinion under its new authority. See id. at 2 & n.4
(explaining that the Commission has the authority “to establish a schedule for agencies to
review requests for federal authorizations required for a project” and defining a biological
opinion required by the Endangered Species Act as a “federal authorization”).
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ule with deadlines for completion of the various federal authorizations, requires agency heads to notify FERC of their anticipated decision dates, and maintains a consolidated record of all authorizations
201
required for the pipeline.
Many horizontal relationships among key state-level stakeholders
also take place at a regional level. While the creation of a regional
202
level entity of state actors creates a state-regional vertical dynamic,
this Section focuses on the way in which horizontal interactions take
place within these entities. For instance, public utility commissions
frequently interact with each other to compare approaches to obtaining cheaper fuels for electricity generation and ways to implement
smart grid technologies, including those that allow more grid ac203
commodation of renewables. State officials that have to implement
rules issued by FERC, RTOs, and state public utility commissions also
have created regional state committees, such as the Organization of
Midwest Independent System Operator (“MISO”) States (also known
as the Organization of MISO States, or “OMS”), to coordinate these
regulating entities’ recommendations and requirements, to influence
new standards of MISO or FERC, and to provide better regulatory
204
oversight of the MISO grid.
Similarly, members of the Western Governors’ Association and
state public utility commissioners within the Western Interconnection
(the western third of the national grid) joined in a horizontal effort to
develop “Western Renewable Energy Zones”—areas amenable to the
205
After gathering
construction of large-scale renewable installations.
state and provincial officials and stakeholders to identify areas with
201. Id. at 8, 16, 24–25. FERC avoids unduly impinging on other federal agencies’ authority by providing that its schedule will comply with those agencies’ federally mandated
timelines. Id. at 8.
202. See supra Part II.B.1.
203. See, e.g., New England Conference of Public Utilities Comm’rs, 65th Annual
NECPUC Symposium: Agenda (May 20–22, 2012) available at http://www.necpuc.org/
Meetings/NecpucAgenda2012.pdf (including topics such as methods of getting shale gas
to New England for generation and residential and commercial use and system “regulatory
adjustments” that may be necessary for this change; “current opportunities and the challenges in modernizing the grid,” including “access to cheaper, more efficient and clean
energy technologies”; and addressing grid challenges associated with interconnecting wind
and variable natural gas resources).
204. OMS Purpose, ORG. OF MISO STATES, http://www.misostates.org/ (last visited Nov.
3, 2012).
205. W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N & DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 109, at 2, 12.
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open land surfaces, land use laws that would allow for renewable development, and abundant renewable resources, the Association is now
206
trying to encourage the construction of transmission to these areas.
It is “working . . . through the Regional Transmission Expansion Project (RTEP) to analyze transmission requirements under a broad
range of alternative energy futures [and to] develop long-term, inter207
connection-wide transmission expansion plans,” which, if successful,
will harness renewable energy from these ideal construction areas and
208
transmit it to load centers.
Within states and localities, different types of regional institutions
allow power plant developers to participate in a centralized process
that coordinates local and state agency approvals. In Oregon, for example, all large utility developers must apply to the Energy Facility Sit209
ing Council for a siting certificate. The state’s Council must extensively consult with other state and local agencies in making the siting
determination, which involves numerous environmental, social, and
210
economic criteria. Municipal zoning laws also apply, but the utility
developer may opt to have the Council determine whether the project
complies with these laws, thus avoiding time-consuming developer
211
negotiations with each individual municipality.
Washington State offers a similar process with strong horizontal
elements, in which the state’s Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council
is to “serve as an interagency coordinating body for energy-related is-

206. See id., at 2 (explaining that the Association hopes to “facilitate the development of
high voltage transmission to those areas with the potential for abundant renewable resources”).
207. Regional Transmission Expansion Planning, W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, http://www.west
gov.org/initiatives/rtep (last visited Nov. 3, 2012).
208. See W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N & DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 109, at 3 (explaining the
initiative’s intention to “undertake . . . efforts to lay the foundation for promoting the efficient regional development, procurement and delivery of energy from renewable resource
areas to multiple population centers”).
209. OR. REV. STAT. § 469.350 (2011).
210. ODOE: Energy Facility Siting: The Siting Process for Energy Facilities, OREGON.GOV,
http://www.oregon.gov/ENERGY/SITING/process.shtml (last visited Nov. 3, 2012); see
also, e.g., Common Power Plant Siting Criteria, PUB. SERV. COMM’N OF WIS., at 3 (Sept. 1999),
http://psc.wi.gov/thelibrary/publications/electric/electric05.pdf (describing the siting
criteria used in Wisconsin as considering “Community Impacts,” “Public Health and Safety
Concerns,” “Environmental Impacts,” and “Land Use Impacts,” among others).
211. ODOE: Energy Facility Siting, supra note 210.
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212

sues,” including the siting of generation facilities. The Council’s
first step toward cooperation comes through its membership, which
includes representatives from the state’s environmental, natural resources, and wildlife agencies; the Department of Commerce; and the
213
Utilities and Transportation Commission. It also involves these and
214
other state agencies in the siting review process. Before submitting
a formal application for certification of a site, a power generator seeking siting approval may apply to the Council for a preliminary site
study, which the Council conducts in coordination with cities and
counties where the site is proposed, as well as other state agencies
215
“that might be requested to comment upon the potential site.” The
Council also conducts some vertical coordination, as it includes fed216
eral agencies in the site study and environmental review process.
Together, these vertical and horizontal relationships reveal ways
in which federalism dynamics interact with energy law’s tripartite
structure and the complexities that a dynamic energy federalism
model captures. Regulatory structures involve many public and private actors functioning at multiple levels of government because they
must respond to the physical characteristics of sources and the structures that move them through generation, transmission, and distribution; those physical interactions involve numerous governing entities,
such as local or regional utilities that deliver retail electricity, multistate transmission line operators, and a federal agency (FERC) that
217
oversees interstate flows. The market forces further reinforce these
complex spatial dynamics. The above-described regulatory frameworks and institutions have expanded and changed in order to help
energy supplies meet growing energy demand, while protecting the
public against potential market distortions—such as utilities resisting
the expansion of transmission that would increase competition (a
218
problem partially addressed by RTOs) —and externalities, such as
212. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 80.50.040(13) (West 2001).
213. Id. § 80.50.030(3)(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2012).
214. See id. § 80.050.030(3)(b) (West 2001 & Supp. 2012) (providing for the participation of other “departments, agencies, and commissions . . . at their own discretion”).
215. Siting/Review Process, ENERGY FACILITY SITE EVALUATION COUNCIL, at 8,
http://www.efsec.wa.gov/cert.shtml#Certification (last visited Nov. 3, 2012).
216. Id.
217. See Spence & Prentice, supra note 175, at 147–49 (describing current regulation of
electricity by the federal government, regional entities, and the states).
218. See ELEC. ENERGY MARKET COMPETITION TASK FORCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
COMPETITION IN WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MARKETS FOR ELECTRIC ENERGY 5, 30 (2007),
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the environmental effects of siting generation and its associated
219
wires.
An understanding of these vertical and horizontal dynamics will
not by itself, however, create an effective response to this complexity
or the need for energy transitions. Rather, these dynamics lay the
groundwork for the next step in this Article’s dynamic federalism
analysis: assessing governance challenges and developing a systematic,
principled response to them. Part III draws from dynamic federalism
to explore the relationship between this spatial complexity and effective governance.
III. GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE COMPLEXITY OF
ENERGY FEDERALISM
Complex spatial interactions among energy actors along both
vertical and horizontal axes create difficult governance issues, which
traditional federalism models that focus on governance levels, rather
than governance itself, often ignore. First, do individual key decisionmakers have adequate authority to allow the energy system to func220
Second, when
tion and evolve in response to modern challenges?
simultaneous overlap and fragmentation occurs, how should the decision-making hierarchy be structured (whether along a horizontal or a
221
vertical axis) and who makes that decision? To what extent do and
should governance structures encourage cooperation among key actors, and when does (and should) conflict play a role in driving regu222
lation? Third, how should governance systems navigate the diversity
of public, private, and hybrid actors that play a role in the energy sys223
224
tem? This Part explores each of these questions in turn.
available at http://energy.gov/oe/downloads/report-congress-competition-wholesale-andretail-markets-electric-energy (explaining that “transmission owners may resist building
transmission facilities if they also own generation and if the proposed upgrades would increase competition in their sheltered markets” and noting that RTOs could help “eliminate any residual discrimination in transmission services”).
219. See Brown & Rossi, supra note 105, at 707–08 (explaining the evolution of centralized state siting processes to address environmental concerns, among others).
220. See infra Part III.A.
221. See infra Part III.B.1.
222. See infra Part III.B.2.
223. See infra Part III.C.
224. Hari Osofsky has explored variations on these governance issues in her federalism
analysis of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, Osofsky, BP Oil Spill, supra note 154, which
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In its analysis, this Part takes a dynamic federalist approach to
exploring the relationship between federalism and governance. Beyond its more nuanced spatialization of federalism questions, the dynamic federalism literature interweaves broader governance questions, such as power structures within decision-making processes, with
traditional federalism concerns. With respect to the first question of
individual decision-maker authority, outside of the energy context
dynamic federalism scholars such as William Buzbee have considered
the ways in which governance gaps rather than overregulation some225
times result from regulatory complexity; these gaps exist throughout the energy system where key regulators often have inadequate authority to achieve important goals.
Regarding the second question, the dynamic federalism literature—again typically without consideration of energy governance
questions—has analyzed issues of hierarchy and cooperativeness that
emerge from overlapping jurisdictional authority of actors at multiple
levels, where no actor has full authority to address a particular externality. With respect to hierarchy, scholars such as William Buzbee,
Ann Carlson, Daniel Esty, and Robert Schapiro have, for example,
226
considered how vertical relationships might vary based on context
and how they might evolve over time through regulatory interac227
The dynamic federalism literature on cooperativeness has
tion.
both provided a range of models for cooperative federalism in which
228
states or local entities implement regulations above a federal floor —
builds upon the model of diagonal federalism she introduced in the context of climate
change, Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism, supra note 119. We draw upon it here because it applies particularly well to energy federalism, and none of the federalism analyses in the energy literature have performed this kind of mapping.
225. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons, supra note 157, at 44–48.
226. See William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
108, 112 (2005); Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons, supra note 157, at 23–27; Esty,
supra note 156, at 609 (1996).
227. SCHAPIRO, supra note 157, at 37–45; Carlson, supra note 157, at 1100.
228. See WILLIAM ANDREEN ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, COOPERATIVE
FEDERALISM AND CLIMATE CHANGE: WHY FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MUST
CONTINUE TO PARTNER 5 (2008), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/
federalismClimateChange.pdf; Holly Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and
Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Framework is Useful for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799, 817 (2008); Alice Kaswan, A Cooperative Federalism Proposal
for Climate Change Legislation: The Value of State Autonomy in a Federal System, 85 DENV. U. L.
REV. 791, 797 & n.24 (2008).
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at times in combination with other theoretical approaches —and
explored how uncooperative interactions can form part of a multi230
level regulatory system, which sometimes inspires constructive regulatory change. Efforts at energy regulation struggle with all of these
hierarchy and cooperativeness concerns, as discussed in this Part.
Finally, regarding the third question of private entities’ participation in governance, a literature analyzing how public-private dynamics
interact with regulatory approaches can help to illuminate these rela231
tionships in the energy context. The intertwining of public and private in energy regulation both poses challenges of institutional design
and of preventing capture, and provides the basis for innovative strategies for meeting all three of these energy governance challenges.

229. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 861, 888 (2006) (“Properly structured, penalty default rules might be used to induce meaningful participation in locally devolved, place-based, collaborative, publicprivate hybrid, new governance institutions, aimed at integrated, adaptive, experimentalist
management of watersheds and other institutions.”).
230. See Kirk W. Junker, Conventional Wisdom, De-emption and Uncooperative Federalism in
International Environmental Agreements, 2 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 93, 96 (2004–05); Jessica
Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1271–80
(2009); Karen Bridges, Note, Uncooperative Federalism: The Struggle over Subsistence and Sovereignty in Alaska Continues, 19 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 131 (1998). Beyond this literature directly focused on uncooperativeness, some scholarship includes conflict as one
strand in its model. See, e.g., SCHAPIRO, supra note 157, at 100; Carlson, supra note 157, at
1107. An extensive literature that addresses cooperation-conflict has arisen in the specific
context of preemption.

See Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 157, at 1576;

Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons, supra note 157, at 47; Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 290–305 (2003);
Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by
Federal Enviromental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579,
582–83 (2008); Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory
State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545, 579 (2007); Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Best of Both Worlds: Environmental Federalism and the Need for Federal Action on Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 27
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 415 (2008).
231. For an example of a broader analysis of public-private, international-domestic regulatory interactions, see Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspective on the Public/Private Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 769
(1998).
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A. Inadequacy of Authority
In part due to the complex federalism map described in Part
II.B, key regulatory entities often lack authority to move critical energy governance decisions forward. This problem is particularly acute
in the context of transmission. As discussed above, the federal government has only limited authority to site needed interstate transmis232
sion lines, and has had trouble exercising it. Regional organizations
also have had trouble exercising authority, with the Seventh Circuit
233
striking down a regional cost-sharing scheme, and this creates uncertainty for new approaches, such as MISO’s approach to sharing the
234
Through
costs of transmission expansion across its territory.
MISO’s “multi-value” approach, regions that demand more electricity
235
The Organizafrom the new lines pay a larger share of the costs.
tion of Midwest Independent System Operator States (“OMS”), however, does not have full authority to expand the law. Public utility
commissions are bound by state law regarding the rates that they can
approve and allow transmission utilities to pass on to customers—
236
including that rates be “reasonable and prudent” and that the rates
237
support projects implemented to respond to public need —and interstate projects like those proposed by MISO will not always fit within

232. See supra notes 137–139 and accompanying text.
233. Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 2009).
234. See

MISO

Transmission

Planning,

MIDWEST

INDEP.

SYS.

OPERATOR,

https://www.midwestiso.org/Library/Repository/Communication%20Material/About%2
0Us_FAQ/TransmissionPlanningFAQ.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2013) (“Beginning in 2006,
MISO instituted regional cost sharing for certain transmission upgrades meeting specified
criteria.”).
235. Klass & Wilson, supra note 110, at 1834–35.
236. See Jim Rossi, Clean Energy and the Price Preemption Ceiling, 3 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE &
ENERGY L. 243, 257 (2012) (“At the state level, regulators apply similar ‘just and reasonable’ rate language under their own statutes in setting retail rates.”). This is similar to
FERC’s just and reasonable wholesale requirement. See Federal Power Act of 1935, 16
U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2006) (“All rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any public utility for or in connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission . . . shall be just and reasonable . . . .”).
237. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-18-510 (2012) (“No person shall commence to construct a major utility facility in the state . . . without first having obtained a certificate of . . .
public need . . . .”).
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this law. It is hard, for example, to demonstrate public need in a state
238
for a line that simply passes through it.
These types of issues run through many other areas of energy law
and at times involve situations where one regulatory entity ostensibly
has authority but other regulatory entities make decisions that impair
implementation of that authority. For example, in the aftermath of
the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Coast Guard tried to create a systematic approach to the placement of boom—physical barriers to the
239
States, however, resisted those decisions and used their own
oil.
regulatory authority and funds given to them from BP to place boom
in ways that at times thwarted the Coast Guard’s efforts to match bar240
riers to the greatest risks based on tidal currents.
Similar blockades emerge in onshore and offshore renewable siting. For example, after Texas identified certain regions of the state as
amenable to wind development and began considering transmission
that would connect to these areas, at least one county in a windy zone
241
passed a resolution opposing wind farms. A number of municipalities in states with abundant wind have similarly enacted moratoria on
242
In the offshore conrenewable development with mixed success.
text, after the Department of Interior (“DOI”) initiated a process to
approve the Cape Wind project, a host of opponents enlisted a variety
of state and federal laws in an effort to block DOI’s support. In a case
that held up the project for several years, citizens unsuccessfully argued that Massachusetts’s state authority over certain aspects of fisheries management under the federal Magnuson-Stevens Act should ex243
Several parties
tend to approval of a wind farm in federal waters.

238. See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 17.
239. Decision-Making Within the Unified Command 17–20 (Nat’l Comm’n on the BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Staff Working Paper No. 2, updated
Jan.

11,

2011),

available

at

http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/

documents/Updated%20Unified%20Command%20Working%20Paper.pdf.
240. Id.
241. Wiseman, supra note 168, at 510 (describing a Gillespie County, Texas resolution).
242. Id. at 510–11 (describing moratoria); see also, e.g., Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy
Footprint, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 279 (2011) (describing a successful Kansas municipal
ban and an invalidated Wisconsin one).
243. Ten Taxpayer Citizens Grp. v. Cape Wind Assocs., 373 F.3d 183, 197 (1st Cir.
2004).
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also invoked the National Historic Preservation Act. Although they
were unsuccessful in blocking the project altogether, DOI ultimately
consulted with the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
(“ACHP”), reduced the number of allowed turbines, and required
changes to their color to accommodate some of the parties’ con245
cerns. While conflict over the existence and extent of authority, as
well as gaps in authority, in some cases leads to needed deliberations
and productive consideration of impacts—as shown by the DOI-ACHP
compromise—it often causes unnecessary and ineffective delay and
could ultimately halt important projects, such as regional transmission plans.
A dynamic energy federalism model, in addition to recognizing
complex vertical and horizontal interactions, also pinpoints the lack
of authority that sometimes is disguised by these interactions. When
multiple actors have a limited amount of jurisdiction over a particular
issue, such as RTO control over certain types of transmission planning
and state and local authority over transmission siting, any one entity
often fails to cover the holes that remain. The model proposed here
requires systematic attention to these problem areas, whether they exist in oil spill response or transmission siting.
B. Simultaneous Legal Overlap and Fragmentation
In a challenge closely related to inadequate authority in some areas, two primary types of regulatory overlap and fragmentation take
place within the tripartite and multi-level energy system. First, significant substantive overlap and fragmentation exists within energy law
and between energy and environmental law. For example, when renewable energy siting takes place on public land, developers often
must navigate both state-level and federal-level environmental review
246
Until siting some transmission
for different aspects of the project.
244. See Danielle E. Horgan, Note, Reconciling the Past with the Future: The Cape Wind Project and the National Historic Preservation Act, 36 VT. L. REV. 409, 410 (2011) (discussing two
Native American tribes’ threats to file suit against construction of the Cape Wind Project,
“citing at least fourteen legal shortcomings by the [Minerals Management Service] under
the National Historic Preservation Act”).
245. Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Secretary Salazar Announces Approval of
Cape Wind Energy Project on Outer Continental Shelf off Massachusetts (Apr. 28, 2010),
available at http://www.doi.gov/news/doinews/Secretary-Salazar-Announces-Approval-ofCape-Wind-Energy-Project-on-Outer-Continental-Shelf-off-Massachusetts.cfm.
246. See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 168, at 501, 504–05 (providing examples of complex
local-state-federal interactions in the siting process).
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lines through the national-level transmission corridor approach succeeds, new interstate transmission lines must gain approval through
state-level public utility commission processes in each state or locality,
247
which vary from state to state. Similarly, for deepwater drilling projects, the Coast Guard regulates the platform level, but DOI regulates
the subplatform level even though activities at the two physical levels
248
In addition, the subcontracting relationships of
are interrelated.
most major oil companies drilling offshore are governed by the state
249
contract law of the nearest state, operating as federal law. In some
cases, jurisdiction overlaps or is simply too complicated to navigate—
potentially causing an anticommons with inadequate levels of energy
250
development.
Second, even though at times the law tries to foster cooperation
or coordination among the many entities with partial control over an
energy issue, structural fragmentation among multiple entities at each
level of governance makes those arrangements complex. For example, in the context of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the NCP governing the response included numerous federal agencies in addition
251
The Department of
to state and local government representatives.
Energy was not included within the group, however, even though it
was very involved in the spill response, and, at times, key clusters of
agencies took actions outside the NCP process. The Environmental
Protection Agency made the key decisions around dispersants, with
sign-off from the Coast Guard, and an ad hoc subgroup of the NCP
team that included the Interagency Solutions group, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Department of Agricul252
ture controlled fisheries closures.
247. Id. at 511–14.
248. CURRY L. HAGERTY & JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41262,
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL: SELECTED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 16 (2010), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41262.pdf.
249. 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006); see also Fruge v. Parker Drilling Co., 337 F.3d 558, 560
(5th Cir. 2003) (“Federal jurisdiction is predicated on the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act (OSCLA) [and] OCSLA adopts the law of the adjacent state (Louisiana) as surrogate
federal law, to the extent that it is not inconsistent with other federal laws and regulations.” (citation omitted)).
250. See Wiseman, supra note 168, at 508 (describing underdevelopment of renewable
energy as a result of multiple layers of authority over the development process).
251. See supra note 185.
252. Decision-Making Within the Unified Command, supra note 239 at 8–9; Osofsky, BP Oil
Spill, supra note 154, at 1086–87.
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Similar fragmentation occurs in the power plant siting process,
particularly for large renewable installations. In some states, municipalities must modify their zoning to accommodate renewable technologies, and the state must conduct an environmental review or ensure compliance with a range of other siting criteria to issue a
253
certificate of need. The developer also must apply to federal agencies for a myriad of assurances, including, for example, certifications
that wind turbines will not interfere with aviation or illegally take en254
dangered species. The number of approvals required can be deceptive; while these processes, combined, may appear comprehensive,
they can leave gaps due to jurisdictional and substantive fragmentation. As Uma Outka has observed, both local and federal processes
often ignore the cumulative environmental impacts of renewable installations, even when a review under the National Environmental
255
Policy Act occurs.
This Section focuses in particular on two governance concerns
that emerge from these two types of overlap and fragmentation. Part
III.B.1 explores the challenges created by competing conceptions of
how the regulatory hierarchy should be structured. Part III.B.2 analyzes the related issue of how cooperative dynamics can and should be
addressed in the energy governance context.
1. Competing Conceptions of Hierarchy
Like the underlying spatial arrangements of governance (along
vertical and horizontal axes), the hierarchy of decision-making within
these arrangements—the entity who decides and the entity who de256
cides who decides —varies across different areas of energy law. In
some instances, a top-down structure dominates. For example, within
federal- and regional-utility-based interactions along a vertical axis,
FERC often issues generalized orders or individual directives that regional transmission organizations must follow, such as tariffs that allow RTOs to operate the grid but specify a number of detailed conditions for grid operation, including the assurance of resource
adequacy (sufficient generation capacity to avoid system interrup253. See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 167, at 502–03 (describing the many layers of approval required for large wind farms).
254. See, e.g., id.
255. See Outka, supra note 242, at 283 (noting that regulatory structures are “reactive”
and that this “leads to consistent and pervasive neglect of cumulative impacts”).
256. Erin Ryan, in her work on negotiating federalism, has grappled with the question
of who decides who decides. Ryan, supra note 161, at 14–20.
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tion), conditions for open access for generators, and the factors that
RTOs may consider in analyzing generator interconnection re257
The new EPA rules on greenhouse gas emissions from staquests.
tionary sources also at times create specific requirements for states
and major utilities, which, although generally creating a floor—not a
ceiling—provide a clear, top-down directive as to the minimum emis258
sions controls that must be achieved.
In other instances, bottom-up efforts dominate. For example,
states have banded together cooperatively to try to meet shared
transmission needs and have then proposed that RTOs—and ultimately FERC—approve cost-sharing schemes necessary for transmis259
And within NERC (the reliability organization desion expansion.
scribed in Part II), any interested member, including an electricity
end-user, can propose that a regional entity of NERC—or NERC it260
self—write a new reliability standard or modify or terminate one.
Finally, dynamic interactions often take place within a mix of topdown and bottom-up decision-making authority. For example, a
comparison of Clean Air Act approaches to mobile versus stationary
sources of greenhouse gas emissions illuminates two different federalism structures. Automobile emissions regulation is an area in which
the Clean Air Act has a particularly strong preemption regime, but
California and states following it can obtain a waiver of preemption
261
This structure has resulted in an itand exceed federal standards.
erative series of conflicting and then ultimately cooperative interactions among the federal government, California and other leader
states and the automobile industry, which has led to rapid development and convergence of greenhouse gas emissions standards under

257. See, e.g., FERC Order No. 2003-C, supra note 135.
258. The Tailoring Rule is a floor-based approach, unlike proposed federal cap and
trade and other national greenhouse gas strategies advocated by certain industry actors,
which would have created a ceiling. See Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 157, at
1569–71. The rule relies on a cooperative federalist regime for implementation, with the
exception of those states that have opted to have EPA implement the rule.
259. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
260. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., RELIABILITY STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
PROCEDURE 11 (2007). Although NERC is a private institution, we treat it primarily as a
public governmental entity, as described in more detail in Part IV.B.
261. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2006).
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the Obama administration.
The Clean Air Act takes a much more
cooperative federalist approach to stationary sources of greenhouse
gas emissions (such as power plants) and, as a result, in some aspects
of its new greenhouse gas regulations applicable to power plants, EPA
gives the states significant implementation flexibility (which varies
based on levels of state compliance with minimum standards). States
can determine which technologies or other control measures must be
implemented to achieve federal emissions caps and which sources will
263
be subject to the most stringent measures. Operating under a federal emissions control floor, they also can require further reductions
264
in greenhouse gas emissions.
These types of back-and-forth top-down to bottom-up interactions do not just occur within familiar cooperative federalist schemes.
These dynamics occur in many other contexts as well, as exemplified
by public utility commissions’ governance of retail rates. Utilities in
“nonrestructured states” that retain a natural monopoly within a service area must charge one retail rate per kilowatt hour for the electric265
ity that they provide to residential customers. This rate is based on
266
the cost of the utility’s providing the service to customers, including
the construction of generation and distribution lines, the maintenance of a truck fleet for service and repairs, and the hiring of various
employees, for example. The rate also incorporates a reasonable rate
of return—money in addition to the cost of service—that the utility is
allowed to make based on calculations of other, similar businesses’ re267
turns.

262. For an in-depth discussion of this evolution, see Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism, supra
note 119; Freeman, supra note 119; see also Carlson, supra note 157, at 1099–1100.
263. Holly L. Pearson & Kevin Poloncarz, With Legislation Stalled, EPA Presses Forward
with Greenhouse Gas Regulatory Program Under the Clean Air Act as January 2, 2011 Trigger Date
Approaches, 587 PLI/REAL 105, 107–11 (2011).
264. Id.
265. Industrial users often have separate, uniform rates. DAVID J. MUCHOW & WILLIAM
A. MOGEL, ENERGY LAW & TRANSACTIONS 52–54 (1990) (describing different rates for different classes and states’ tendency to shift more of the rate burden to industrial classes).
266. Id.; MICK LONG, TEXAS PUBLIC UTILITY COMM’N, ELECTRIC REGULATION IN TEXAS
(2009) (packet prepared by Mr. Long for Hannah Wiseman’s “Law of Electricity” class at
the University of Texas) (on file with author) (showing the line items that went into the
cost of service calculation for SOAH Docket No. 473-08-3436).
267. MUCHOW & MOGEL, supra note 265, at 52–54.
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Within this process, the utility typically can initiate a ratemaking
268
To initiate a rate case, the utility
proceeding from the bottom up.
files with the state public utility commission and brings boxes full of
269
After the comevidence on costs and returns to the commission.
mission confirms that the filing is complete, it often makes initial determinations about facts that do not require administrative review and
then lists the many remaining factors in dispute. It then conducts (or
has an administrative court conduct) a formal ratemaking proceed270
ing, in which electricity customers and other affected parties partic271
The parties haggle over the utility’s necessary costs and the
ipate.
rate of return—typically paring down the costs that are counted with272
in the rate base and the requested rate of return —and the public
273
utility commission ultimately sets the acceptable rate. This top-down
decision can once again be turned on its head, however, when the
utility or the public utility commission later requests another rate
case, thus restarting the entire process.
Utilities that operate transmission lines or RTOs go through this
same top-to-bottom, bottom-to-top dynamic with FERC. The operator—either an individual utility or the RTO—initially applies to FERC
for a transmission tariff, which sets in motion a federal ratemaking
proceeding with calculations similar to those described for state retail

268. See Stefan H. Krieger, The Ghost of Regulation Past: Current Applications of the Rule
Against Retroactive Ratemaking in Public Utility Proceedings, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 983, 993 n.39
(noting that “usually the utility initiates proceedings to change rates”).
269. See id. at 994–95 (describing the process of approving utility rates).
270. In Texas, for example, in areas that remain regulated, the Public Utility Commission makes the initial determinations regarding the completeness of the file and the facts
that do not require consideration and then sends the ratemaking case to the State Office
of Administrative Hearings (SOAH) for a formal hearing. Long, supra note 266; see also
MUCHOW & MOGEL, supra note 265, at 52–54 (“Generally, the initial [rate] decision is
made by an administrative law judge who presides at the hearings and issues a recommended decision to the utility commission itself.”). Florida’s Public Service Commission,
in contrast, conducts ratemaking hearings itself and makes the final rate determination.
FLA. PUBLIC SERVICE COMM’N, ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITY RATEMAKING IN FLORIDA (2011)
available at http://www.floridapsc.com/publications/consumer/brochure/Ratemaking.
pdf.
271. See, e.g., FLA. PUBLIC SERVICE COMM’N, supra note 270 (explaining that affected
parties may participate in a rate increase proceeding).
272. Long, supra note 266.
273. Kreiger, supra note 268, at 996.
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electricity. Once FERC approves a tariff with a rate and conditions
of service, the individual transmission operator or an RTO often ap275
The amendments eiplies to FERC requesting tariff amendments.
ther are requested due to bottom-up demands (demands for expanded transmission, for example—thus necessitating a higher rate) or
new, top-down FERC orders that require transmission operators to
follow new rules, such as providing more assurance of adequate back276
up generation capacity to avoid grid outages.
Recognizing that various hierarchical dynamics occur within a
horizontal or vertical relationship—with top-down and bottom-up approaches to governance—enables a more nuanced understanding of
possibilities for structuring energy law institutions. It allows for consideration of how energy institutions pull in the many entities affected
by energy decisions and grant these entities different levels of power
depending on the particular energy issue at hand.
2. Cooperation and Conflict
Energy governance approaches also vary in the extent to which
they encourage or rely upon cooperativeness. There are many examples of cooperative federalism along both the vertical and horizontal
axes. For instance, states are trying to work together in the electricity
context through MISO’s Multi-Value Project (“MVP”), introduced
above, which will provide expanded transmission to allow more generation to connect to the grid while also connecting regional benefits
277
The states governed by MISO,
to costs to ensure fair cost sharing.
through their Organization of MISO States, also cooperate regularly
274. See, e.g., Danielle Changala & Paul Foley, The Legal Regime of Widespread Plug-in Hybrid Vehicle Adoption: A Vermont Case Study, 32 ENERGY L.J. 99, 113 (2011) (summarizing the
requirements for Open Access Transmission Tariffs). The calculations often are far more
complicated due to FERC rules on cost sharing and the need to ensure that those customers receiving the benefits of transmission pay for the costs of the transmission service creating the benefit. See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, FACTS: ORDER NO. 1000 (2011)
(providing a summary of FERC’s new cost allocation reforms).
275. See, e.g., Amendments, CALIFORNIA ISO, http://www.caiso.com/rules/Pages/
Regulatory/Amendments/Default.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2012) (listing California ISOauthored tariff amendment filings).
276. See, e.g., infra note 278 and text accompanying note (describing MISO’s filing to
amend its tariff to comply with new FERC resource adequacy requirements).
277. Press Release, MISO, MISO Board Approves 215 New Transmission Projects (Dec.
8, 2011), available at https://www.midwestiso.org/AboutUs/MediaCenter/PressReleases/
Pages/MISOBoardApproves215NewTransmissionProjects.aspx.
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to intervene in FERC proceedings—often shifting among positions
that support a MISO policy or filing, oppose it, or follow a middle
278
ground.
Focusing on only cooperative federalism, however, would miss
the many critical uncooperative dynamics that help to structure interactions along both axes and resulting governance approaches. On
the vertical axis, for example, lawsuits filed by states opposing FERC’s
federal imposition of transmission siting authority made FERC restart
its National Interest Electric Transmission Corridor designation process. For instance, in a case brought by the Minnesota Public Utilities
279
Commission and environmental groups, the Fourth Circuit held
that even when a state commission denies a transmission siting application, FERC does not have federal authority to select an appropriate
280
site.
As with directional hierarchy, interactions among entities often
vary in how cooperative and conflicting they are over time. Ann Carlson has explained in the environmental context that these iterative
281
interactions can help to foster needed regulation over time. These
types of interactions also occur throughout energy law. The Delaware
River Basin Commission (“DRBC”), which governs natural gas well
development in the Delaware River watershed and is discussed in
depth in Hybrid Energy Governance, exemplifies these shifting relationships within a regional institution. The state members and single federal representative that serve on the DBRC initially cooperated to
draft a comprehensive set of regulations governing the location of
well sites, controlling erosion from sites, requiring water testing prior
to drilling and fracturing, and imposing a number of other con-

278. See, e.g., Notice of Intervention and Protest of the Organization of MISO States,
Inc., Docket No. ER11-4081-000, at 1–2 (undated, but in protest of July 20, 2011 filing),
available at http://www.misostates.org/images/stories/Filings/OMSProtestandComments
onMISORARER11-4081.pdf (arguing—in opposing MISO’s proposed modification of its
FERC tariff to address resource adequacy requirements for generation capacity—that the
action “negatively impacts state jurisdictional responsibilities, lacks clear net benefits, and
should not be found just and reasonable” and that in following an allegedly “extensive”
stakeholder process, MISO in fact ignored repeated stakeholder votes against the proposed changes).
279. Piedmont Envtl. Council v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 558 F.3d 304 (4th
Cir. 2009).
280. Id. at 319–20.
281. Carlson, supra note 157, at 1099–1100.

2013]

DYNAMIC ENERGY FEDERALISM

837

282

straints on the gas extraction process.
The process temporarily
broke down, however, when individual state members began to question the adequacy of the process (with New York demanding an environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Poli283
cy Act in federal court ) and the substance of the regulations (with
Delaware’s governor asserting that he would not vote for the regulations, which he viewed as insufficiently protective of the environ284
ment ). Based on these state concerns, the DRBC has delayed finalizing its rules and has continued to hold hearings and respond to
285
public comments in an attempt to reach a constructive compromise.
C. Inclusion of Private Actors Within “Public” Processes
In addition to grappling with questions of authority and of overlap and fragmentation among key governmental entities, the energy
system involves a peculiar fusing of public and private interests, which
results in its governance structures varying in the extent to which they
286
This involvement of private entities in multi-level,
are fully public.
ostensibly public, processes poses the challenge of establishing appropriate and effective inclusion of private interests without allowing
inefficient capture of the public processes. The vertical and horizontal dynamics described in Part II make this task substantially more
complex.
Often, the entities that form relationships along both axes are an
odd combination of private authorities vested with quasi-formal regulatory authority and public entities that adopt privately drafted rules.
RTOs, for example, which impose detailed rules on their private utility members, are governed by an independent board of managers or

282. DELAWARE RIVER BASIN COMM’N, REVISED DRAFT NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT
REGULATIONS (Nov. 8, 2011), available at http://www.nj.gov/drbc/library/documents/
naturalgas-REVISEDdraftregs110811.pdf.
283. Complaint at 1-2, New York v. Army Corps of Engineers, CV11-2599 (E.D.N.Y.
2011).
284. Susan Phillips, As Delaware Announces No Vote on DRBC Regulations, Monday’s Meeting
in Doubt, STATEIMPACT (Nov. 17, 2011), http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2011/
11/17/as-delaware-sets-to-vote-no-on-drbc-regulations-mondays-meeting-in-doubt/.
285. For an in-depth discussion of the DRBC, see Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 17.
286. See, e.g., STEPHEN BIRD, HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GRP., at Appendix A-RTO
Governance (2002), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/Bird%20ISO
%20gov%20comparison%20matrix%20App%20A.pdf (comparing ISO governance structures and each board’s public and private parties).

838

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:773
287

board of directors comprised of both public and private experts.
These boards, in turn, respond to an advisory committee typically
comprised of private generators, transmission owners, power market288
ers, and electricity end users, among others. The rules written and
implemented by this public-private RTO are largely influenced, and
in some cases must be directly approved by, FERC—both through its
289
general orders directed at all RTOs and the specific transmission
290
tariff that FERC issues to the RTO.
NERC has even stronger private elements, as it operated as a self291
When
governing, industry-led institution for nearly four decades.
Congress infused more public elements into the process for ensuring
grid reliability in 2005, it nonetheless left much of the responsibility
for grid reliability with NERC, which continued to be a private organization. Specifically, Congress directed FERC to approve an “electric
reliability organization” (“ERO”) that would govern grid reliability
292
and only gave FERC review authority over it. After FERC approved
NERC as the ERO in 2006, NERC continued writing and enforcing
standards, which are now mandatory and federally enforceable but
293
still private in nature.
These issues, however, are not limited to the innovative hybrid
entities that are the focus of our next article on hybrid energy gov-

287. Id.
288. Id.
289. See, e.g., FERC Order No. 888, supra note 127, at 3–6 (mandating functional unbundling of transmission service from electricity sales); FERC Order No. 1000, at 1–14 (Final Rule, issued July 21, 2011) (establishing planning and cost allocation reforms for
transmission). For all FERC orders governing ISOs and RTOs, see Major Orders, FERC,
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto/maj-ord.asp (last visited Nov. 1,
2012).
290. See Summary of Compliance Filing Requirements, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N,
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/oatt-reform/sum-compl-filing.asp (last
visited Jan. 21, 2013) (describing the process by which utilities file transmission tariffs for
FERC approval).
291. Company

Overview:

History,

N.

AM.

ELEC.

RELIABILITY

CORP.,

http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=1|7|11 (last visited Nov. 1, 2012) (describing industry’s formation of the National Electric Reliability Council, the Corporation’s predecessor,
in 1968).
292. Energy Policy Act of 2005, 16 U.S.C. § 824o(a)(2) (2006).
293. For an in-depth discussion of NERC, see Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 17 (manuscript at 35–43).
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ernance; complex public-private dynamics abound throughout the
fundamental structures of the energy system. State public utility
commissions and their ratemaking processes retain many private elements; private utilities powerfully influence the process, for example,
294
While a public utility
because they can initiate a ratemaking case.
commission can reduce the costs claimed by contesting their validity
in a formal hearing—as can citizen groups—the utility is a key and influential player that substantively defines the initial boundaries of the
295
regulation, including the rate that ultimately will be set.
These dynamics between utilities and their regulators are particularly complex in the context of transmission. As discussed in Part II,
although many states no longer consider electricity generation to be a
296
Innatural monopoly, transmission still is largely regarded as one.
deed, it does not make sense to create redundant transmission architecture. But infrastructure investments by the gatekeeper entity can
lead to unproductive market power that stifles innovation and compe297
tition. This market structure around transmission creates a publicprivate regulatory dynamic that is unlikely to change any time soon, as
the government tries to regulate the monopoly to make it act more in
the public interest than it naturally would.
These issues also arise in the context of the fuels used in the energy system. For example, the response to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil
spill was ostensibly led by the government, but was highly dependent
on BP as the legally responsible party. The National Contingency
Plan is structured around high levels of involvement by the designated responsible party, but the public-private dynamics were made even
more complicated by the interface with the physical realities and
technological complexity of the spill response. BP, due to its access to
the site and initially superior technical knowledge, played a major
298
role in shaping available information and steps taken.
This combining of public and private within the energy system
provides both a challenge and an opportunity. On the one hand, the
strong interaction of public and private power and preferences can
294. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
295. See, e.g., The Rate Making Process, RESIDENTIAL UTILITY CONSUMER OFFICE, STATE OF
ARIZONA, http://www.azruco.gov/rate_making.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2012) (explaining the utility’s role in the ratemaking process).
296. Vaheesan, supra note 80, at 110.
297. See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text.
298. For an in-depth discussion of governance issues in the context of the BP Deepwater
Horizon oil spill, see Osofsky, BP Oil Spill, supra note 154.
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undermine efforts to achieve needed change, such as when transmission utilities try to block new connections or retail utilities want high299
er rates from customers. The private influence on public decisionmaking carries risks of regulatory capture. On the other hand, these
intersections create the opportunity for regulatory innovation that
may help spur needed transformation, and they allow those with the
technical information necessary for effective regulation to participate
in the regulatory process.
Together, these three challenges suggest the need for new approaches to governance tailored to address them. These approaches
need to acknowledge the complexity of the current system, and to be
able to work with it. Realistically, the United States is unlikely to
completely overhaul energy regulation or the overall energy system in
the coming years. For energy governance approaches to functionally
respond to modern challenges, therefore, they must effectively navigate the dynamism of the current system and build upon established
structures. The Conclusion that follows provides principles for doing
so and introduces our next article, which will apply these principles of
dynamic energy federalism to assess regulatory innovations we describe as “hybrid energy governance.”
IV. CONCLUSION: DYNAMIC FEDERALISM PRINCIPLES FOR MORE
EFFECTIVE ENERGY GOVERNANCE
Addressing the challenges outlined in Part III is daunting but
critical. The United States is in the midst of a massive energy transition toward new unconventional domestic fuel development (such as
deepwater drilling and hydraulic fracturing), an updated grid, and
300
greater integration of renewables; these shifts demand fresh governance strategies. The emerging energy federalism scholarship provides important initial suggestions for effective steps forward, but it
lacks a cohesive vision and dynamism that will be necessary for suc301
cessful energy policy.
Having proposed a dynamic federalism model for energy, which
recognizes the nuanced vertical and horizontal relationships among
actors and the complexities of energy governance across the many
302
subfields of energy laws, this Article concludes by proposing three
299. See supra Part I.A.
300. See supra Part II.
301. See supra notes 162–170 and accompanying text.
302. See supra Part III.
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core dynamic federalism principles drawn from its analysis in order to
guide energy governance strategies moving forward. These principles
each seek to address one of the governance challenges outlined in
303
Part III. Our forthcoming article Hybrid Energy Governance then
builds on this Article’s model through an in-depth analysis of institutions that embody these principles through their hybrid, regional approaches and that, by using these approaches, support needed energy
transition. In particular, Hybrid Energy Governance examines efforts by
Regional Citizens Advisory Councils and the Delaware River Basin
Commission to address the risks of oil spills and hydraulic fracturing;
by NERC to maintain grid reliability in the face of technological
change; and by Regional Transmission Organizations to create transmission lines and market integration for renewables, particularly
wind. That Article complements this one by assessing both the mechanisms and the benefits and limitations of operationalizing these
three dynamic energy federalism principles through hybrid regional
institutions.
Principle One: We need institutions or multi-institutional structures with capacity for multi-level, cross-cutting regulatory authority.
As described in Part III.A, the inadequacy of authority occurring
across numerous substantive areas of energy law results from no single
institution at any particular level of governance having enough authority and from insufficient coordination among the institutions that
have partial authority. Addressing this governance challenge therefore requires approaches that constitute authority, which, through
combining key actors and institutions, can comprehensively address
an energy issue.
One strategy for creating this authority that is currently being
employed in multiple areas of energy law is the establishment of what
we term “hybrid” institutions. “Hybrid” has been used in many different ways in legal scholarship; we define it here as referring to institutions that combine authority from more than one source, whether as
a formal or informal part of their structure or governance process. By
virtue of this combining, these institutions draw from the regulatory
authority of key stakeholders and foster or force collaborations. The
examples we use in Hybrid Energy Governance represent different variations of this type of institutional hybridity.
Principle Two: We need institutions that reduce simultaneous
overlap and fragmentation by creating structures through which hier-

303. Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 17.

842

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:773

archy can be defined, cooperation can take place, and conflicts can
be resolved.
As described in Part III.B, the simultaneous overlap and fragmentation in the energy regulatory system—caused by both substantive and structural divisions—results in challenges regarding how to
order hierarchy and how to foster productive opportunities for cooperation and conflict. Addressing these governance challenges requires institutions or processes that can bring together substantive
and structural silos and can create a more efficient and effective approach.
While these institutions or processes may have synergies with the
ones created in response to the first principle, the focus is different.
Even if institutions within the fragmented system have enough authority, the principle aims to address divided governance structures in
order to create a more functional overall system.
As with the first principle, hybridity will be needed here. Hybrid
institutions, by including important but separated entities in a shared
process, can help to resolve some of the complexities. We focus in
particular on hybrid entities with significant regional components because operating on a scale between two governance levels might encourage cooperation, or even cooperative conflict, among actors from
both levels. For each hybrid entity that we examine in Hybrid Energy
Governance, smaller-scale actors interact through a regional structure,
which is also able to interact with larger scale regulatory institutions.
Principle Three: We need institutions that can integrate key public and private stakeholders with structural and procedural protection
against capture.
As described in Part III.C, many energy regulatory institutions involve private actors in a variety of ways. Although integrating governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders is a crucial part of effective energy governance, these institutions need ways of protecting
themselves against capture by private market participants whose interests may not align with those of the public.
As with the previous two principles, hybrid structures may be able
to accomplish these aims more effectively than ones structured
through one authority at a single level. The hybrid entities we examine in Hybrid Energy Governance all include private actors, but with substantial public oversight and involvement—particularly through expanded stakeholder involvement in decision-making processes. Our
examination of these entities in that piece showcases different models
for private entity inclusion and assesses the extent to which they effectively limit possibilities for capture.
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The dynamic energy federalism model that we have presented in
this Article is not a panacea. It identifies the nuances of federalism
that should be recognized when analyzing the effectiveness of energy
institutions and suggesting change, including complex vertical and
horizontal interactions that occur simultaneously—with local, state,
regional, and federal actors engaging in novel relationships. It also
explores the complicated governance schemes within these interactions, including, in some cases, inadequate authority of various actors
along either axis, overlapping or fragmented authority, iterative conflict and cooperation among these actors, and high levels of private
304
entity involvement in governance.
In illuminating the complexities of energy federalism and governance and suggesting principles that can be systematically applied
across many energy areas, the model neither eliminates the system’s
underlying structural challenges nor the massive transitions that it
faces. Instead, this Article argues that this type of analysis has value
because it provides for a holistic, nuanced understanding of how regulation fits into the energy system, and the federalism and governance
challenges that result. This understanding can help to create systematic solutions to our governance challenges that can complement current discussions of particular components of the energy system. In
embracing the complexity of energy and its governance, we must recognize energy for what it is: the enabler of our daily activities and international economy; a multi-stranded system of infrastructure, markets, and regulation; and the driving force behind unusual
governance forms. With this recognition comes greater opportunity
for a future buttressed by cleaner, fairer, and more efficient energy.

304. See supra Part III.

